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Of Communism, Treason, and Addiction:
An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the
Military's Anti-Gay Policy
Taylor Eynn?
INTRODUClION
In an attempt to escape from Bowers v. Hardwick's1 apparent
stranglehold on same-sex conduct, some opponents of the military's
exclusionary policy have searched for alternative, "status-based" arguments
to support an equal protection challenge.2 In Hardwick, the Supreme
Court held that a state's criminalization of same-sex sodomy does not
violate the rights to privacy and substantive due process.3 Federal courts
have expanded Hardwick's reach on two fronts. First, some federal courts
have reasoned that Hardwick's due process holding forecloses an equal
* Director, Lesbian and Gay Rights and AIDS Project, American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California. BA., Dartmouth College (1986); J.D., Columbia Law School
(1991);J.S.M., Stanford Law School (1995). This Article was made possible by the support of a
teaching fellowship at Stanford Law School. In particular, I would like to thank Miguel
Mendez, Kathleen Sullivan, Robert Weisberg, and Frank Wu for their insightful comments.
Special thanks to Janet Halley for her encouragement as well as for her tireless and
painstaking review of the various stages of this Article.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, red'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
2. See, ag., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-21, at 1424-25
n.32 (2d ed. 1988) (suggesting that pursuant to the Supreme Court's "status"
decisions-Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968)-the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments may forbid penalization of same-sex
orientation and same-sex conduct); Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military.
Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 Creighton L. Rev. 384, 468
(1994) (arguing that Robinson and Powell prohibit the military's penalization of a gay
servicemember's presumed propensity to violate the regulation "because propensity is status");
Claude Millman, Note, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 Colum. J.L & Soc.
Probs. 267, 285-86, 295-300 (1988) (arguing that same sex orientation constitutes a protected
status under Powel).
3. Hardwick, 478 US. at 190-192, 196. The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick
defined sodomy without regard to the sex of the persons involved, criminalizing both
same and different-sex sodomitic conduct. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (1984) ("A person
commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."). The
defendant, Michael Hardwick, was arrested for same-sex sodomy. Hardick, 478 U.S. at
187-88. The court ignored the broad reach of the Georgia statute and addressed only
same-sex sodomy. Id. at 188 n.2. In dissent, Justice Blackmun observed that the Hardwick
majority chose to treat the case as an "as applied" challenge to the statute, and that
the majority opinion exhibited an "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity." Id.
at 200-01 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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protection challenge.4 Second, courts have applied the reasoning of
Hardwick not only to the criminalization of sodomitic conduct but also to
the penalization of same-sex orientation.- In Padula v. Webster, for
example, the D.C. Circuit made both of these leaps in logic.8 The court
stated that it would be "quite anomalous," in light of Hardwick's due
process holding, to accord heightened equal protection scrutiny to
classifications based on sexual orientation; in addition, it described sodomy
as "the behavior that defines the class" of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay
men.7 To counter this approach, some courts have attempted to peel apart
the conflation of status and conduct, reasoning that while Hardwick permits
the criminalization of same-sex sodomy, it does not address the imposition
of penalties based solely upon an individual's same-sex orientation!
Top policy makers also have reasoned that act and identity are
distinct. In his announcement of the revisions to the military's discharge
policy (the "1994 Directives"),9 President Clinton stated that "the emphasis
4. The courts have been able to apply Hardwick in this manner because they have
used conduct to define a person's status as gay. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The issue presented us is only whether homosexmals, when defined as
persons who engage in homosexual conduct, constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classifica-
tion .... ."); see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1004 (1990) (noting that plaintiff had not admitted to engaging in same-sex conduct, but
viewing her status as a lesbian as compelling evidence that she had engaged in or would
engage in such conduct). By defining same-sex orientation so as to make conduct and status
synonymous, the courts have been able to apply the Hardwick rationale to penalize status.
5. These decisions have held that, because Hardwick allows same-sex sodomy to be
criminalized, there is no heightened protection for gay persons as a suspect or quasi-
suspect class. See, e.g., Ben-Shalorm, 881 F.2d at 464-65 (upholding Army's refusal to re-enlist
sergeant on basis of homosexuality against First Amendment and due process challenges);
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1003
(1990) (upholding FBI's refusal to hire applicant on basis of homosexuality against equal
protection challenge); Padua, 822 F.2d at 103 (upholding Navy's discharge of reserve officer
on basis of homosexuality against privacy and equal protection challenges).
6. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
7. Id.
8. An increasing number of federal decisions-even if overturned on ap-
peal-have either held or suggested in dicta that the military's discharge policy violates
equal protection on the ground that it impermissibly discriminates based on a person's sexual
orientation. Sc4 e.g., Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir.
1994) (stating that there is a "constitutionally significant danger of making status a surrogate
for prohibited conduct"); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that
military classification on the status of sexual orientation was "not rationally related to any
legitimate goal"), rev'd 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Able v. United States, 880 F.
Supp. 968, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding the military's discharge policy unconstitutional
under the First and Fifth Amendments); Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993)
(granting injunction to prevent discharge based on same-sex status because of likelihood that
an equal protection challenge willsucceed); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830
F. Supp. 1319, 1328-37 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that the military's discriminatory policy on
sexual orientation had no legitimate government purpose).
9. Department of Defense [DOD] Directive 1332.14, Office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Pub. No. 605-93 (Dec. 23, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1994
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should always be on people's conduct, not their status."' The 1994
Directives' vaunted distinction between status and conduct, however, seems
to be in name only. Like its predecessor," the revised policy subjects
same-sex conduct to more stringent regulation than different-sex conduct.
This differential treatment acts as a public badge of subordination. Under
the 1994 Directives, it remains possible to discriminate based upon sexual
orientation in the guise of regulating conduct. The 1994 Directives
conflate status and conduct by relying upon an ostensibly "rebuttable"
presumption that, in effect, mandates discharge for servicemembers who
identify themselves as gay.'2 Because such self-identification-especially in
defiance of a state-prescribed discharge policy-may act as a form of
political dissent, 3 the 1994 Directives' prohibition against disclosing one's
gay identity seems to constitute discharge based upon a person's status and
beliefs.
In challenges to the 1994 Directives and its predecessor, a recent wave
of decisions have held unconstitutional the exclusion of lesbians, bisexuals,
and gay men when the only evidence of same-sex "conduct" is the
servicemember's self-identification as gay. 4 These courts, as well as some
pro-equality commentators, 5 have drawn upon three criminal law models
by characterizing same-sex orientation as akin to a status and a form of
Directive 1332.14]; Department of Defense [DOD] Directive 1332.30, Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Pub. No. 605-93 (Dec. 23, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter 1994 Directive 1332.30].
10. Statement by President Bill Clinton, Introduced by Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin, July 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library. FEDNEW file [hereinafter Clinton
Statement].
11. The preceding version of the Directives had been promulgated in 1981. DOD
Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 at App. A (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Directive 1332.14];
DOD Directive 1332.30, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 at App. A (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Directive
1332.30].
12. As the policy's nickname, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," suggests, the 1994 Directives do
not permit servicemembers to disclose their sexual identity. The Directives also purport to
prohibit the questioning of servicemembers or recruits about their sexual orientation in the
absence of evidence of same-sex conduct. See Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Pub.
No. 605-93, Overview of Directives Implementing the New DOD Policy on Homosexual
Conduct in the Armed Forces 1 (Dec. 23, 1993) (discussing the five areas covered by the new
policy) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pub. No. 605-93]. What the political process gave
with one hand, however, it took away with the other. The National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 564 (Supp. V 1993), is subject to amendment to permit the
Secretary of Defense to reinstate the questioning of recruits concerning their sexual identity
whenever the Secretary deems it necessary. See Act of Nov. 30, 1993, Pub. L No. 103-160, §
571(d), 107 Stat. 1673.
13. See infra notes 22326 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
15. By "pro-equality," I mean to describe those individuals (or courts) who posit a
model of equality for lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. I use the term "pro-equality"
rather than "pro-gay" because I believe that the underlying foundation for this
position extends beyond support for the particular issue of sexual orientation and
encompasses the broader principle of equal protection for all persons.
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political expression. The first model relies upon Robinson v. California and
Powell v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court announced the constitutional
impermissibility of criminalizing the status of addiction to narcotics and
alcohol.' In the context of military litigation, this model posits the
constitutional impermissibility of criminalizing the status of same-sex
orientation. 7 The latter two models depend upon a characterization of
same-sex orientation-particularly "coming out," disclosing one's gay
identity-as akin to a form of political expression. The second model is an
analogy to the Supreme Court's restrictions upon the criminalization of
subversive advocacy pursuant to statutes such as the Smith Ace s and the
Subversive Activities Control Act1 9  The final model looks to the
development of the American law of treason, with its rejection of the early
English law of constructive treason, which permitted conviction based upon
one's thoughts alone.2 0 Because these three models may be gaining favor
as precedent among courts holding the military's discharge policy
16. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533-34 (1968) (stating that Robinson v.
California prohibits criminalization of status absent a proscribable act); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law which criminalized
narcotics addiction absent evidence of an illegal act violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
17. Numerous federal courts have invoked Robinson and Powell in the non-criminal
context of the military's discharge policy. See, 6g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d
699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (invoking Robinson for the proposition that
states may not penalize gay persons based solely upon sexual orientation); Selland v. Aspin,
832 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993) (same); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F.
Supp. 1319, 1335 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (same). For the argument that Robinson and Powell are
directly applicable to the non-criminal sanctions imposed by the discharge policy, see Valdes,
supra note 2, at 427-28 (arguing that it is irrelevant whether status-based sanctions are
criminal or non-criminal in nature because the crux of the Robinson and Powell decisions is a
prohibition against making a presumption of misconduct based on status).
Even assuming, arguendo, that Robinson and Powell do not directly apply in a non-
criminal context, this should not foredose reference to these decisions by analogy. See, eg.,
Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994) ("While not
controlling because the discharge process is not a criminal proceeding... Robinson [and]
Powell... nevertheless point out the constitutionally significant danger of making status a
surrogate for prohibited conduct."); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(describing two areas of criminal law-treason and subversive advocacy-and arguing that the
principles therein apply by analogy in a non-criminal context), rev'd, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc); Selland, 832 F. Supp. at 15 (stating that Robinson could apply in a non-
criminal context).
18. In a series of decisions discussed infra part III, the Supreme Court upheld §§ 2-
3 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. at §§ 10-11 (1946) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385
(1988)), which criminalize subversive advocacy and active membership in groups which
advocate violent governmental overthrow. For the language of §§ 2-3, see infra note
235.
19. For example, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Supreme
Court rejected as unconstitutional § 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1954) (amended as 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1991)). For the language of §
6, see Infra note 215.
20. For a discussion of the law of treason, see generally infra part IV.
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unconstitutional, pursuing an in-depth examination of their implications is
urgent.
This Article argues that, although at first glance these models may
appear to be enticing bases for overturning the exclusionary policy, pro-
equality advocates should not rely on them for two principal reasons. As a
matter of doctrine, any value as precedent collapses under the weight of
closer scrutiny; as a historical matter, gay persons have been and may
continue to be associated with the stigmatized groups found in each
model.
The doctrinal value of these models is weak because, in all three
areas, the Supreme Court has upheld some convictions which it asserted
were conduct-based but which arguably were based upon the defendant's
status or beliefs!' These differing interpretations for the basis of the
convictions stem from the instability of the categories of "status" and
"conduct." For example, the reasoning in both Robinson and Powell suggests
that the state cannot penalize an alcoholic for the status of simply "being
drunk," yet the state may criminalize the act of "being drunk in public."2
The ability of the state to narrowly circumscribe the "status" category
suggests a line of argument for the government litigators in military
litigation: That the 1994 Directives protect the status of "being gay," while
permissibly mandating discharge for the act of "being gay in public," such
as disclosing one's same-sex orientation to a fellow servicemember.
Reliance on these three models also may ignite in the minds ofjudges the
longstanding, historical association of same-sex orientation with certain
stigmatized groups. The Robinson and Powell decisions suggest the
pathologizing trope of same-sex orientation as an addiction, mental illness,
or irresistible compulsion to engage in sex. Similarly, the subversive
advocacy and treason decisions may evoke the historical comparison of gay
persons with Communists and traitors. Given McCarthyism's demonization
of Communists, traitors, and gay persons as threats to national security,
these associations are especially potent in the context of military litigation.
Judges who are presented with arguments that subtly reinforce historical
notions that nonheterosexuals are somehow diseased or present a security
risk may view the anti-gay policy as more reasonable than they otherwise
might have. For instance, during the en bane rehearing for Steffan v.
Peny2--in which the subversive advocacy analogy was presented-one
judge asked why the military could not discharge someone for being gay,
since it presumably could do so if a servicemember were Communist.24
21. See e.g., infra part II.C.1 (arguing that Powell v. Texas failed to protect
alcoholic status); infra part Ill.C.3 (arguing that Dennis v. United States failed to
protect defendant's Communist status); infra part IV.B.I.c (arguing that Haupt v. United
States failed to protect defendant's beliefs).
22. See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text (discussing how Powel narrowed
Robinson).
23. 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
24. See infra notes 300-16 and accompanying text (discussing how, historically,
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While it is not possible to ascertain whether the analogy prompted the
question, the judge's question, at the very least, illustrates how these
negative associations may influence judicial reasoning.
Part I of this Article considers the 1994 Directives and the ways in
which it targets sexual orientation despite President Clinton's claim of a
status versus conduct bifurcation. Parts II-IV examine, respectively, the
analogies to Robinson and Powell, subversive advocacy, and treason
decisions. Each part looks, first, to the doctrinal strengths and weaknesses
when applied 'to the 1994 Directives and, second, to the historical
associations that may (mis)inform judicial decisionmaking.
I. THE 1994 DwEarIVs
In announcing the revisions to the 1994 Directives, President Clinton
emphasized the "essential elemen' of the policy. "service men and women
will be judged based on their conduct not their sexual orientation. " 2'
Similarly, Attorney General Reno, in evaluating the 1994 Directives' legal
defensibility, concluded that "the policy implements the distinction
between 'status' and 'conduct' .... "26 The 1994 Directives do facially
purport to mandate discharge only for same-sex conduct. Section H.l.a of
the 1994 Directives provides: "A statement [that one is gay] ... is grounds
for separation not because it reflects the member's sexual orientation, but
because the statement indicates a likelihood that the member... will
engage in homosexual acts."2 This change from the preceding policy,
however, is superficial rather than substantive. The superficiality of the
change is indicated in part by Clinton's eleventh hour concession to
modify what had been the central tenet of the 1994 Directive's policy.
"homosexual orientation is not a bar to military service." 28 At a hearing in
society has attributed similar subversive characteristics to communists and gay
persons).
25. Clinton Statement, supra note 10.
26. Memorandum from Janet Reno, United States Attorney General, to Bill
Clinton, President, Memorandum for the President, Defensibility of the New Policy on
Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (July 19, 1993) (on file with author). See
also Melissa Healy, Clinton to Stress Conduct as Key for Gays in Military, L.A. Times,
Nov. 13, 1992, at Al (describing newly-elected President Clinton's plan to implement
status versus conduct distinction into military regulations).
27. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.l.a. The revised policy's definition of
"propensity" likewise draw a distinction between status and conduct: "Propensity to engage in
homosexual acts means more than an abstract preference or desire to engage in homosexual
acts; it indicates a likelihood that a person... will engage in homosexual acts." 1994 Directive
1332.30, supra note 9, Definitions (13).
28. On February 10, 1994-live days after the 1994 Directives were originally
scheduled to take effect-President Clinton agreed to delete the phrase, which
originally appeared three times in the regulations. Rowan Scarborough, White House
Cuts Phrase Restricting Gay Discharges, Wash. Times, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al. This
modification was considered an important victory by Republican Senators who opposed
the revised policy. Rowan Scarborough, GOP Senators' Demands Reflected as "Don't
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the fi-st case considering the 1994 Directives, Judge Nickerson called the
revised policy "a bit of a hoax."29 In his written opinion, he observed that
"the allegedly new policy makes the same distinction between homosexuals
and heterosexuals as did the prior policy." "°
Both the language and government interpretation of the 1994
Directives support Judge Nickerson's conclusion. The revised policy
regulates same-sex conduct more stringently than different-sex conduct,
creating a governmentally sanctioned form of differential treatment which
has no rational basis. While the 1994 Directives purport to regulate
conduct alone, they nevertheless discriminate based upon sexual
orientation. Finally and most significantly, the 1994 Directives collapse the
categories of status and conduct by relying upon a supposedly "rebuttable"
presumption that in effect requires discharge for servicemembers who state
that they are gay."' The rebuttable presumption treats the statement "I am
lesbian," made from one servicewoman to another, as substantially
equivalent to "Let's have sex." 2 This prohibition against coming out
constitutes discharge based upon one's sexual orientation while also
suppressing political expression.
A. Public Symbol of Subordination
As did their predecessor, the 1994 Directives require differential
treatment for similar conduct depending upon the sexual orientation of
the servicemember. Directives 1332.14 and 1332.30 of the 1994 policy
require discharge based upon same-sex conduct, but do not require
comparable treatment for heterosexual conduct3 3 The 1994 Directives
target same-sex conduct even though-as both the President and Secretary
of Defense have conceded-proscribed sexual conduct "is already covered
by the laws and rules which also cover activities that are improper by
heterosexual members of the military."4 This disparate treatment of gay
Ask, Don't Tell" Takes Effect, Wash. Times, Mar. 2, 1994, at A4. The 1994 Directives now
provide that "[a] person's sexual orientation is a personal and private matter and is not a bar
to continued service under this section unless manifested by homosexual conduct." Id.
29. William M. Reilly, Federal Judge Criticizes Gays in Military Policy, UPI, Mar.
18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
30. Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
31. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. 1994 Directive 1332.14 concerns the separation of enlisted servicemembers on
the grounds, inter alia, of homosexual conduct. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at
(H). 1994 Directive 1332.30 contains similar provisions concerning the separation of
enlisted servicemembers. 1994 Directive 1332.30, supra note 9, at (C). See also,
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.), denial of re'g en banc, 746 F.2d 1579, 1581
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (noting that, in contrast to its approach to same-
sex conduct, the Navy handled issues of different-sex conduct on a case-by-case basis).
34. Clinton Statement, supra note 10; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant on
Rehearing En Banc at 3-4, Steffin v. Perry 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-5409) (on
file with author) (discussing testimony of Hon. Les Aspin, - Gays in the Military.
Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)) [hereinafter
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persons under both the former and revised policy functions as "an
important public symbol of... subordination."'
B. Locking the Closet Door Rebuttable Presumption Against Coming Out
Section H.l.b(2) of the 1994 Directives, which sets forth the policy's
rebuttable presumption, can be unpacked into five propositions. First,
subject to rebuttal, section H.1.b(2) mandates discharge for a
servicemember who discloses her same-sex identity: "A member shall be
separated... if... [tlhe member has made a statement that he or she is
a homosexual .... ". Second, a servicemember can avoid discharge if she
can demonstrate that she "is not a person who... has a propensity to
engage in... homosexual acts." 7 Third, section H.1.b(2) makes the
tautological presumption that the servicemember's statement alone does in
fact demonstrate such a propensity. "A statement by a Service member that
he or she is a homosexual... creates a rebuttable presumption that the
Service member engages in homosexual acts.... ." Fourth, although
section H.1.b(2) specifies that "[p]ropensity... means more than an
abstract desire to engage in homosexual acts," 9 the 1994 Directives fail to
require evidence of actual conduct: Section H.l.b(2) simply defines
"propensity" as "a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in
homosexual acts." 40 Finally, while section H.1.b(2) lists factors which "may
be considered" in determining whether a servicemember has successfully
rebutted the presumption 4 the military's own personnel guidelines
suggest that, regardless of the evidence proffered by the member, it is
virtually impossible to rebut the presumption.
Section H.J.b(2) of the 1994 Directives presumes future misconduct
based solely upon a servicemember's statement of same-sex identity.
Francisco Valdes has described the rebuttable presumption as requiring a
"three-step inference" that views (1) a servicemember's statement (2) as an
indication of a propensity to commit misconduct (3) which creates a
Reply Briefi.
35. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 499, 509 (1991) (comparing expressive purpose of
military's anti-gay policy to military's former exdusion of African-Americans and women).
36. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.1.b(2).
37. Id.
38. Id. Moreover, the 1994 Directives define "homosexual conduct" as induding,
inter alia, "a statement by the Service member that demonstrates a propensity or intent
to engage in homosexual acts...." 1994 Directive 1332.30, supra note 9, at
Definitions (9).
39. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.1.b(2).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. For a discussion of the factors which the military's personnel training manual
considers and of the reasons it is virtually impossible for a servicemember to rebut the
presumption, see infra text accompanying notes 60-68.
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presumption of same-sex conduct. Judge Nickerson concluded that this
presumption impermissibly conflates status and conduct: "[The 1994
Directives] go so far as to make any statement of homosexual orientation,
wherever and whenever made, even a statement to this court, as proof of
an intent to engage in homosexual acts."4 Under the current Directives,
it is irrelevant whether a servicemember, by coming out, is making a
political statement, confiding her thoughts to a therapist, or filiig a
lawsuit; the rebuttable presumption creates its own form of Orwellian
"newspeak." The 1994 Directives, in effect, translate a statement of status or
identity ("I am a lesbian") into a statement of conduct ("I intend to have
sex with a woman").
1. Government's Rationale
In support of this rebuttable presumption, the government is likely to
argue that it can make "administrative presumptions that rest on 'a sound
factual connection between the proved and inferred facts.'"4 In Steffan v.
Pery, the military argued that there is a "sound factual connection"
between gay identity and same-sex conduct. Pro-equality advocates could
disprove this assertion with expert testimony by psychologists who assert
that no clear connection between act and identity exists. In Cammermeyer v.
Aspin, the district court relied upon the testimony of Dr. Laura Brown
when it granted summary judgment for Colonel Margarethe
Cammermeyer, who was challenging her discharge from the military. Dr.
Brown stated that "there is almost no relationship between an individual's
orientation and his or her sexual conduct."47
Not all courts, however, would agree with the Cammermner court.
Judge Reinhardt's dissent in Watkins v. United States Arry states: "To
pretend that homosexuality or heterosexuality is unrelated to sexual
conduct borders on the absurd."" Fortunately, a court need not resolve
this question. The government's presumption against coming out fails in
43. Valdes, supra note 2, at 471.
44. Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1040-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). The court
granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the military from
taking further discharge actions against the plaintiffs during the pendency of the litigation. In
fact, the military had already taken adverse action against several of the plaintiffs based upon
the complaint's identification of their sexual orientation. Id. at 1045-46.
45. Brief for the Appellees on Rehearing En Banc at 15, Steffan v. Perry, 8 F.3d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-5409) (on file with author) (quoting NLRB v. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 442 U.S. 773, 787 (1979)).
46. Id. at 15-16.
47. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (W.D. Wash. 1994). Colonel
Cammermeyer was discharged after she acknowledged that she is lesbian in response to
a question asked during a top secret security check required for admission to the
ArmyWar College. Id. at 913-12.
48. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1361 n.19 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vaated, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc), cert. deded, 498 U.S. 957
(1990).
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several ways. First, the government irrationally presumes that only gay
persons will act upon their sexual desires in violation of military
regulations. This leads to the odd presumption that a serviceinember who
states "I'm bisexual" will engage in prohibited same-sex acts, but not in
prohibited different-sex acts. Second, the Directives' presumption is in
effect irrebuttable. Finally, the presumption suppresses political dissent and
participation.
2. Presumption is Factually Flawed
Even assuming a nexus between sexual orientation and sexual
conduct, the government has shown no factual basis for assuming that
same-sex conduct mandates discharge while different-sex conduct does not.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice criminalizes sodomy and certain
other forms of sexual behavior such as harrassment, regardless of the
gender of those involved.49 As the Ninth Circuit observed in Meinhold v.
United States, "[A] serious question is raised whether it can ever be rational
to presume that one class of persons (identified by their sexual preference
alone) will violate regulations, whereas another class (identified by their
preference) will not." This differential treatment leads to a particularly
absurd result for bisexual servicemembers. The 1994 Directives presume,
for instance, that a bisexual woman will engage in oral sex with women,
but not with men. There is no factual support for this asymetrical
presumption. Dr. Gregory Herek, a respected research psychologist,51 has
concluded:
There is no evidence to support the notion that lesbians and gay
men are more likely than heterosexuals to engage in sexual
harassment or open sexual activity or that gays are less able to
control their sexual impulses than straights. Nor is there any basis
for the belief that gays are sexually predatory or that they will try
to convert or recruit heterosexuals.
Ironically, the most compelling evidence that sexual orientation does
not correlate with capacity to serve or with sexual misconduct comes from
the military itself. For instance, studies issued by the government
consistently have undercut the basis for the military's anti-gay policy.59
49. See supra note 34.
50. Meinhold v. United States, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Car. 1994).
51. Dr. Gregory Herek is currently an associate research psychologist at the
University of California at Davis. Affidavit of Gregory Herek, published in slightly modified
form in Gays in the Military:. Joseph Steffan Versus The United States 129 (Marc
Wollnsky & Kenneth Sherrill eds., 1993) [hereinafter Herek Affidavit]. In 1989, Dr.
Herek received an award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions to Lesbian and
Gay Psychology from a division of the American Psychological Association. Id.
52. Id. at 128.
53. The Navy's 1957 "Crittenden Report" concluded that "[m ]any exclusively homosexual
persons have served honorably in all branches of the military service .... "Tle Crittenden
Report: Report of the Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recommendations to the
Secretary of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures, and Directives Dealing with
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Moreover, on the day that President Clinton announced the revised policy,
he acknowledged that "there is no study showing [gay persons] to be less
capable or more prone to misconduct than heterosexual soldiers."5
President Clinton also recognized that lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men
have served in the military with honor, and that other nations have
integrated nonheterosexuals into their armed forces with no discernable
negative consequences." Thus, even if the government reasonably
presumed a correlation between same-sex orientation and same-sex
conduct, the military's own studies and remarks by its Commander-in-Chief
indicate that there is no rational basis for selectively subjecting gay persons
to differential treatment.
3. Presumption is Effectively Irrebuttable
Rebutting the 1994 Directives' presumption is nearly impossible; even
"senior Pentagon officials acknowledge that [the presumption] would be
difficult ' 56 for a servicemember to rebut. In effect, the 1994 regulations
presume that servicemembers who have stated that they are gay will break
the rules and must be discharged. To rebut the presumption, a
servicemember must present "evidence that he or she does not engage in
homosexual acts and does not have a propensity or intent to do so."57 In
addition, "[t]he member shall bear the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that retention is wananted .... .,5s
Proving a negative-that one did not do something-is particularly difficult
because the military's investigation into sexual conduct is not limited to an
allegation of specific acts which occurred on specific days. Even more
significant, the servicemember must prove the absence, not of an act, but
of a tendency to commit an act. The first judge to consider the revised
policy concluded, "[While] in theory there is a slim chance that a plaintiff
might be able to rebut [the military's presumption]," as a practical matter,
"that presumption is virtually irrebuttable." 9
Homosexuals 1, 13, reprinted in Homosexuality and the Military. A Sourcebook of Official,
Uncensored U.S. Government Documents (1993) [hereinafter The Crittenden Report]. More
recent military reports likewise support the conclusion that gay persons can serve effectively in
the armed services. A 1992 study by the DOD concluded, "major psychiatric and psychological
organizations... disagree wtih the DOD's policy and believe it to be factually unsupported,
unfair, and counter-productive. In addition, two DOD service commissioned study efforts have
refuted the DOD's position on the potential security risk associated with homosexual orienta-
tion." See, g., General Accounting Office, Department of Defense's Policy on Homosexuality,
reprinted in Homosexuality and the Military. A Sourcebook of Official, Uncensored U.S.
Government Documents 3 (1993) [hereinafter The 1992 Study].
54. Clinton Statement, supra note 10.
55. See id.
56. Eric Schmitt, Gay Troops Say Clinton's Policy is Often Misused, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1994, at Al, ClO.
57. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.1.b(2).
58. Id. at § H.4.e.
59. Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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The Department of Defense's personnel training manual, which
suggests how the revised regulations should function in practice, illustrates
the difficulty of rebutting the presumption.60 For exanple, the manual
describes an officer who confided in his best friend that he has recently
come out to himself as gay, but that he has never engaged and never will
engage in same-sex acts while in the military. At his hearing, several male
officers and enlisted men testified that the officer never suggested that he
is gay or ever made any sexual advances toward them or anyone they know;
the officer is a truthful and outstanding leader; and they believe that the
officer will abide by the regulations which proscribe same-sex conduct.
61
In offering this evidence at his hearing, the officer introduced every
category of evidence which the 1994 Directives specifically enumerate as
relevant to the determination of whether a servicemember has rebutted the
presumption. Section H.l.b(2) provides that a servicemember may submit
testimony concerning, inter alia:
(a) whether the member has engaged in homosexual acts;
(b) the member's credibility;
(c) testimony from others about the member's past conduct,
character, and credibility; [and]
(d) the nature and circumstances of the member's statement. 2
Because the officer is attempting to prove a "negative" propensity-that he
has not and will not engage in same-sex acts-it is difficult to imagine any
evidence which would be more effective than that which he proffered.
However, such evidence is likely to be insufficient. As the personnel
training manual explains, the 1994 Directives presume that "the statement
[of same-sex orientation] ... is evidence that the member engages in or is
likely to engage in homosexual acts." 6 In fact, the manual concludes that
the evidence in this hypothetical is equivocal: the military could retain the
member or could recommend separation."
The manual describes another situation in which a servicemember
expressed confusion over his sexual identity and stated to his commanding
60. The Department of Defense released its personnel training manual in
conjunction with its issuance of the December 22, 1993 version of the revised
Directives. In a series of consecutively numbered hypotheticals, the personnel manual
describes situations in which servicemembers may face discharge. Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Pub. No. 605-93, Hypothetical Teaching Scenarios for
Commanders and Personnel Involved in Recruiting, Accession Processing, Criminal
Investigations, and Administrative Separations (Dec. 23, 1993) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Personnel Training Manual].
61. Seeid. at hypothetical 13.
62. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.l.b(2)(a)-(d). The list of factors is
not exhaustive; section H.l.b(2)(e) states that the military may consider "any other
evidence relevant to whether the member is likely to engage in homosexual acts." Id.
at § H.l.b(2) (e).
63. Personnel Training Manual, supra note 60, at hypothetical 12. In this
hypothetical, as in hypothetical 13, there was no evidence of proscribed conduct
other than the servicemember's statement that he is gay.
64. Id. at hypothetical 13.
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officer that he might be gay.65 In this situation, even the servicemember
does not know whether he has a propensity to engage in same-sex conduct.
The manual recommends that an investigation not be instituted because
"[i]t is not at all dear that the Service member intended to make a
statement that he is homosexual."66 Nonetheless, the manual leaves open
the possibility that the commander may initiate a separation action,7
which is precisely what occurred in the case of Marine Corporal Kevin
Blaesing." Believing his communication to be privileged, Blaesing
confided to the military psychologist that, although he was not sure, he
thought he might be gay.69 The psychologist reported this discussion to
Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Martinson, Blaesing's commanding officer.
Martinson, who acknowledged that he is not comfortable with gay persons,
initiated discharge proceedings and sequestered Blaesing.70
Although the Marine Corps has since withdrawn Blaesing's discharge
recommendation,7' servicemembers in a similar situation have no
assurance that they would be allowed to remain in the military. Blaesing's
discharge proceedings illustrate the highly subjective nature of the 1994
Directives, which leave such decisions to the commanding officer's
discretion. Blaesing's discharge had been approved by the then
commander of the Marine Corps Forces Atlantic, General William Keyes.
One month later, Keyes retired and was replaced by a new commander
who withdrew the discharge recommendation. 72 Blaesing, while happy
about his reinstatement, believes that his military career has been harmed
irrevocably.73
Blaesing's situation demonstrates the ease with which the military has
circumvented the status versus conduct distinction, particularly through its
reliance upon the rebuttable presumption. Not only was there no evidence
of same-sex conduct, but even Blaesing was uncertain whether his "status"
was that of a gay, bisexual, or heterosexual man. The evidentiary
65. Id. at hypothetical 1.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Morning Edition: Marine May Be Discharged for Thinking He Might Be Gay,
(National Public Radio Broadcast, June 8, 1994), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, NPR
File [hereinafter Morning Edition I].
69. Id. Blaesing has stated that he was never informed that his conversations
with a military psychologist become part of his military health record. Id. Blaesing's
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Martinson conceded that he too had thought
that such conversations were privileged. Id. Martinson acknowledged that he does not discuss
the issue of doctor-patient confidentiality with the servicemembers. Id.
70. Id. Martinson claimed that he sequestered Blaesing for fear of "what other
folks might do to [Blaesing] and how that would reflect on the Marines if they did."
Id.
71. Morning Edition: Marine Won't Be Discharged for Wondering if he was Gay,
(National Public Radio Broadcast, August 11, 1994), available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, NPR
File.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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difficulties facing Blaesing were enormous: to rebut the military's
presumption, he had to prove that he did not have the propensity to
engage in same-sex conduct when he might not have known the answer
himself.
4. Presumption Deters Political Expression
Blaesing's discharge proceeding also illustrates that the military's
prohibition against coming out suppresses expression at both an individual
and a systemic level. At an individual level, Blaesing confidentially revealed
to his psychologist that he was questioning his sexual orientation. Based
upon this private disclosure of a core aspect of his personal identity, the
military became actively engaged in some of Blaesing's innermost
thoughts-whether he is sexually attracted to men and whether he is likely
to act upon any such attraction while in the armed services.74 In addition
to this intrusion into Blaesing's individual autonomy, military policy
transformed Blaesing's confidential disclosure into a statement bearing
political significance.7" The socio-political significance of Blaesing's
statement stems largely from the symbolic weight of a governmentally-
prescribed anti-gay policy. As Kenneth Karst observed, "Especially in the
context of the central expressive function of the Army's exclusion
regulation, coming out is not just an act of self-definition but an act of
political expression."76
The 1994 Directives' rebuttable presumption not only limits the
servicemember's potential for political expression, its effects may ripple out
to deter dissent on a broader social scale:
[T]he collective, communal impact of forced silence amounts to
more than an accumulation of violations of individual integrity. It
creates a form of state orthodoxy. If speaking identity can
communicate ideas and viewpoints that dissent from majoritarian
norms, then the selective silencing of certain identities has the
74. The military will intrude more actively in Blaesing's thought process if Blaesing
attempts to rebut the presumption in the hope of salvaging his career. Nonetheless, even
prior to the completion of Blaesing's discharge, his private thoughts have been made public.
As BIaesing stated, "It's been humiliating that rve had my personal and private life discussed
in offices at the barracks, that my personal and private life's been put on documents and
papers and doctors' statements.. . ." See Morning Edition I, supra note 68.
75. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 973 (1989) (discussing several
cases In which employers took action against employees upon indirectly learning of
employees' gay identity); see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446-56
(6th Cir. 1984), cer. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (upholding termination of plaintiff who had
confided to a co-worker that she was bisexual).
76. Karst, supra note 35, at 561. As early as 1979, the California Supreme Court
recognized that coming out constitutes a form of protected political expression
because it increases the visibility of gay persons and enables gay people to organize
politically. Gay Law Students Ass'n. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)
(ruling that job discrimination against nonheterosexuals was prohibited by a statute that
barred utility from interfering with employees' right to engage in political activity).
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opposite, totalitarian effect of enforcing conformity.7
The 1994 Directives arguably enforce conformity to an even greater extent
than did their predecessor. On the face of the 1981 Directives, no gay
persons, whether serving in silence or not; were permitted in the military.
In contrast, the 1994 Directives condition the service of nonheterosexuals
on their silence. The 1994 Directives thus accept "the closet" as the
consensus on the appropriate expression of gay and lesbian identity,
thereby creating an unjustifiable sense of consent on the part of the very
persons oppressed by the regulations.
This mandate of silence is particularly significant because coming out
is potentially one of the most powerful methods available to gay persons
for effecting social change. Dr. Herek concluded that "knowing an openly
gay person is predictive of supportive attitudes even in demographic
groups where hostility is the norm. . . ."7 Moreover, because
servicemembers may fear bearing a public identity as gay and risking
discharge, 9  the Directives' presumption is likely to deter all
servicemembers-regardless of their sexual oientation-from entering the
public debate about the military's exclusionary policy and other gay rights
issues. Servicemembers perceived to be gay may suffer additional
consequences, including the loss of physical safety, housing,0 and custody
of children. Furthermore, individuals who disagree with the anti-gay policy
may be dissuaded from serving in the armed forces, an opportunity
associated with full citizenship and which traditionally has provided
77. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 Va. L Rev. 1695, 1719 (1995)
(discussing the suppression of speech which identifies oneself as gay).
78. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 131. See also Gregory M. Herek, Stigma,
Prejudice, and Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in Homosexuality:. Research
Implications for Public Policy 60, 76-77 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds.,
1991) (concluding that studies indicate that degree of prejudice against gay persons
decreases as knowledge about gay people increases).
79. See generaly Halley, supra note 75 (arguing that sexual identity is created
through political and social discourse, and that, absent heightened protection for
sexual identity, persons supportive of gay rights may be deterred from full political
participation).
80. For instance, the commanding officer expressed concern that Blaesing might
become a victim of anti-gay violence by fellow Marines. Morning Edition I, supra note
68; se also Evelyn C. White, Brutal Assaults Grow More Common, S.F. Chron., Apr. 27,
1994, at Al (discussing upsurge in gay-bashing in San Francisco and nationwide). In the
infamous case of Sharon Bottoms, the district court awarded custody of Ms.
Bottoms' son to his grandmother, despite evidence that the grandmother's partner may have
sexually abused Ms. Bottoms when she was a child. Lesbian Appeals Ruling Basing Child
Custody on Sex Preference, LA. Times, Feb. 17, 1994, at A27. The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (finding
lesbian mother unfit and awarding custody of child to child's grandmother against mother's
wishes).
Gay parents may likewise be thwarted in their attempts to adopt their partners'
children. Sep ag., Matter of Dana, 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1189 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994) (denying
petition for second-parent adoption by non-biological lesbian mother on grounds of lack of
standing).
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educational and career opportunities frequently unavailable to lower-
income persons."1
The military's regulations also may deter servicemembers, particularly
those who are gay, from participating in a forum quintessentially associated
with political participation-demonstrations and parades. While the revised
policy ostensibly permits servicemembers to attend a gay-rights parade,
members can be discharged for carrying placards which suggest that they
are gay."2 The military's tautological reasoning that appearance at a
parade may be used to launch an investigation if an observer considers this
to be sufficient evidence that the attendee may be gay further deters
participation in gay rights demonstrations and parades.3 The 1994
Directives also proscribe same-sex handholding and kissing," which at
times may be a form of political expression: Gay activists have organized
"kiss-ins" and handholding demonstrations -to protest the marginalization
of nonheterosexuals. 2 Thus, even in the wake of the revised 1994
Directives, it remains true that "the exclusion policy is, above all, political
theater,"8 theatre which deters those most affected from meaningful
participation in the political arena.
II. THE ANALOGY TO THE SUPREME COURT'S "STATUS" DECISIONS
In numerous challenges to the military's exclusionary policy, federal
courts have relied by analogy upon the Supreme Court's status decisions,
Robinson v. California8 and Powell v. Texas,'8 for the proposition that the
armed service's policy of selectively discharging servicemembers based
upon the status of their same-sex orientation is unconstitutional. In
Robinson$2 and Powell," the Supreme Court held that criminalizing the
81. &e, ag., Karst, supra note 35, at 500 (arguing that the military's 1982
exclusionary policy violated the principle of equal national citizenship).
82. Personnel Training Manual, supra note 60, at hypothetical 6 (stating that
the military may investigate a servicemember who carried a sign which read, "Lesbians
in the military say, 'Lift the Ban,'" because the sign could be interpreted as making a
statement that the member is lesbian).
83. At his confirmation hearing, Defense Secretary William Perry acknowledged
that participation in a gayrights parade, going to a gay bar, or reading gay
literature-all of which the revised policy purportedly allows-may be used to
Initiate an investigation "if a reliable person observed behavior that he or she
believes amounts to a nonverbal statement that the servicemember is a homosexual."
Hanna Rosin, The Ban Plays On: the Fallacy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," The New
Republic, May 2, 1994, at 12.
84. In the second of the hypothetical teaching scenarios, the Pentagon indicated
that handholding by servicemembers of the same-sex may "constitute[] credible
information of homosexual conduct." Personnel Training Manual, supra note 60, at
hypothetical 2.
85. Valdes, supra note 2, at 464 n.395 (describing Queer Nation's Idss-ins as political
expression (citing Partners, Summer 1992, at 8)).
86. Karst, supra note 35, at 546.
87. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
88. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
89. 370 U.S. at 667 (holding that a state law which criminalized narcotics
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status of drug addiction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments'
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. A pro-equality
examination of the wisdom of the Robinson/Powell analogy is necessary
because of the recent wave of military discharge decisions invoking
Robinson and Powell to support the conclusion that the exclusionary policy
violates equal protection.9' The inclusion of the Robinson/Powell analogy
in these recent decisions offers pro-equality advocates a false-and
potentially damaging-promise.
There are three principal reasons for pro-equality advocates to reject
reliance upon Robinson and Powell. First, the Supreme Court's decision in
Powell severely limited the scope of Robinson when it held that an
alcoholic's appearance in public while drunk constituted a proscribable act
rather than a protected status. 2 Powell arguably leaves a court free to
uphold the penalization of "conduct," which actually may be a protected
"status." Second, the Supreme Court upheld Powell's conviction in part
because it was concerned that little was known about the cause of
alcoholism.9 3 Pro-equality litigators similarly may become trapped in the
currently unresolvable issue of the etiology.of sexual orientation.
Finally, the Robinson and Powell decisions are likely to invoke the long-
held, stigmatic association of same-sex orientation with addiction, mental
illness, and an irresistible compulsion to engage in sex.94 This possibility
has troubling implications. There is a risk that these stigmatizing
associations may inflame any pre-existing negative images of gay persons
that judges may hold. Even assuming some utilitarian value to invoking
Robinson and Powell, the utility is far outweighed by the likelihood that
reliance upon these decisions could perpetuate the stigmatic
misperceptions of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men.
addiction absent evidence of an illegal act violated the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
90. 392 U.S. at 533 (stating that Robinson prohibits criminalization of a status
absent a proscribable act).
91. Recent military discharge decisions which have relied upon Robinson or Powel
include: Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 927 n.25 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (noting
that the plaintiff relied upon Robinson and that the court accepted the characteriza-
tion of plaintiff's discharge as based solely upon status); Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12,
1617 (D.D.C. 1993) (ordering temporary injunction barring the military from discharging
plaintiff based solely upon gay status); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F.
Supp. 1319, 1337 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (holding discharge policy unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds). Earlier, in 1989, Justice Norris also mentioned Robinson. Watkins v.
United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (holding that
military was estopped from barring soldier's reenlistment solely because of gay status).
92. Powe, 392 U.S. at 532-33.
93. Id. at 521-22.
94. See infra notes 164-201.
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A. Robinson, Powell, and Status
1. Robinson
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that a California
statute"5 criminalizing the status of narcotics addiction violated the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.96 Characterizing "addiction" as an "illness,"' 7 the Court
invoked the traditional criminal requirement of an actus reus 3 and held
that the California statute criminalized mere status without the
requirement of an act. The Court noted, "California has said that a person
can be continuously guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used
or possessed narcotics within the State, and whether or not he has been
guilty of any antisocial behavior there."9 Despite arguably probative
evidence of prior narcotics use-needle marks on Robinson's arm O---the
Supreme Court overturned Robinson's conviction. The Court stated that,
while California could proscribe criminal acts such as narcotics
trafficking,' there was no evidence that Robinson was engaged in illegal
conduct at the time of his arrest.0 2
2. Powell
Six years later, a plurality of the Court drastically narrowed Robinson's
scope in Powell v. Texas; upholding the conviction of an alcoholic for
appearing drunk in public. 0 3 While the plurality reaffirmed Robinson's
status/conduct distinction,1°4 the Justices were far from unanimous in
their reasoning; there were two separate concurring opinions in addition
95. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721 (West 1962) (providing, in part, "No person
shall... be addicted to the use of narcotics...."). In 1963, the quoted language was
deleted.
96. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). Under the doctrine of
incorporation, the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, eg., Valdes, supra note 2, at 391 n.21. Valdes has argued that the
Eighth Amendment's status versus conduct distinction subsequently has been accepted as
part of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which now prohibits status discrimination. Id.
at 385, 448-49 (describing the contours of the "new Fourteenth Amendmentjurisprudence").
97. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (stating that narcotics addiction "is apparently an
Illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily.").
98. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 1.2(b), at 8 (2d
ed. 1986) (stating that criminal liability requires an actus reus and cannot be
premised merely upon guilty thought).
99. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
100. Id. at 661.
101. Id. at 664.
102. Id. at 661 n.2 ("[A]t the time the police first accosted the appellant, he was
not engaging in illegal or irregular conduct... ").
103. Poweli 392 U.S. at 536.
104. Id. at 533 ("The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has
committed some act, has engaged in, some behavior... [or] has committed some actus
reus.").
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to the plurality opinion. °5 The plurality distinguished Robinson on the
ground that the Texas statute0 6 at issue in Powell did require an
act-appearing in public while drunk. "The State of Texas thus has not
sought to punish a mere status .... [but] has imposed... a criminal
sanction for public behavior ....
3. Conceptions of Status
Despite the centrality of status in both decisions, neither the majority
opinion in Robinson nor the plurality in Powell specifically defined the term.
The concept of status dates back to the medieval period, in which each
person was assigned a fixed status in the rigidly hierarchical societyYss
The notion that persons were defined and limited by their status-for
instance, that a serf could never become a landowner-gradually evolved
into a conception of individual autonomy."' Nevertheless, certain status
categories remained for those who were economically or socially
dependent, including married women, children, slaves, the poor, and the
mentally ill." 0
Interestingly, the Robinson Court's notion of status intersects with the
historical concept of dependency: Robinson characterized narcotics
addiction as akin to mental illness and leprosy,"' both of which may
leave a person economically and socially dependent upon others. The
concept of status utilized in Robinson and Powell, however, also diverges
from the historical view. Both decisions imbue the term with meaning by
opposing it with "conduct." For example, the Court in Robinson relied
upon the trial judge's instructions to the jury, distinguishing a narcotic
addict's status from the act of using narcotics. The trial judge stated, "To
be addicted.., is said to be a status or condition and not an act. It is a
continuing offense.., and subjects the offender to arrest at any time
before he reforms." 
2
In his Powell concurrence, Justice White set forth the Justices' only
105. Justice Marshall authored the plurality opinion. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517-37.
Justice Black, id. at 537-48, and Justice White, id. at 548-54, authored separate
concurring opinions.
106. The statute required a fine for any person who "shall get drunk or be found
in a state of intoxication in any public place." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 477 (West 1952).
107. Powe, 392 U.S. at 532.
108. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L L
Rev. 112, 145-46 (1987).
109. Id. at 146. For a more in-depth discussion of the evolution of the concept of
"status," see id. at 144-53.
110. Id.
111. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (stating that "[iut is
unlikely that any State... would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person
to be mentally ill, or a leper .... We cannot but consider the statute before us as of
the same category.").
112. Id. at 662-63.
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attempt to define status in either decision. In addition to relying upon the
traditional criminal law dichotomy between status and act, Justice White
incorporated the notion that the status be fairly long-lasting and have deep
importance in an individual's life: "[A status is] a condition brought about
by acts remote in time from the application of the criminal sanctions
contemplated, a condition which was relatively permanent in duration, and
a condition of great magnitude and significance in terms of human
behavior and values."""
3
Most courts and commentators that invoked the Robinson/Powell
analogy assumed with little discussion that sexual orientation fell within
Justice White's conception of status. 4 In his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, for example, Justice Blackmun asserted that homosexuality
constitutes a status, noting that "[h] omosexual orientation may well form
part of the very fiber of an individual's personality."" s Studies support
Justice Blackmun's assertion that one's sexual orientation is a fundamental
and largely enduring component of one's personal identity:. "There is no
reason to think that it would be any easier for homosexual men or women
to reverse their sexual orientation than it would be for heterosexu-
al[s] .... ,, The American Psychological Association likewise concluded
that "homosexual orientation is not easily modified," 17 suggesting that it
is of "relatively permanent duration."""1
B. Pro-Equality Reliance Upon Robinson and Powell
Of the three analogies-Robinson/Powell, the subversive advocacy
cases,"9 and the law of treason"--the Robinson/Powell analogy offers
the most favorable precedent for pro-equality advocates. A primary
advantage of the Robinson/Powell analogy is that it shifts the focus of
inquiry from the permissible criminalization of sodomy, announced in
Bowers v. Hardwick,121 to the consideration of sexual orientation as a
113. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 n.2 (1968) (White, J., concurring). Francisco
Valdes has incorporated the notions of personal significance, relative permanence,
and the opposition to conduct in his definition of status: "[S]tatus becomes an
attribute of the person that lingers even when he or she is not engaged in any
specific category of conduct." Valdes, supra note 2, at 395.
114. However, for a detailed discussion of the ways in which same-sex identity
fulfills Justice White's definition of status, see Millman, supra note 2, at 285-86, 295-300.
115. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Millman, supra note 2, at 181 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 297 & n.177 (citation omitted).
118. Powel, 392 U.S. at 55P n.2. Justice White's requirement of "duration" does not
necessitate either a determination of the etiology of sexual orientation or a finding of
Immutability; one's sexual orientation simply needs to be "relatively" permanent. Moreover,
the Court in Robinson recognized that the status of addiction may be acquired voluntarily or
Involuntarily. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (stating that narcotics addiction "may be contracted...
involuntarily.") (emphasis added).
119. Seeinfra part III.
120. Seeinfrapart1V.
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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status. In addition, both Robinson and Powell include within their protection
of status the notion that the state may not penalize a person's assumed
propensity to commit misconduct.
1. Escape from Hardwick
In the aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, many lower court decisions
have assumed that Hardwick's due process holding forecloses an equal
protection challenge to the criminalization of same-sex conduct and to
discrimination based upon same-sex orientation.1" In an attempt to
escape from Hardwick, some courts and commentators have turned to the
Robinson/Powell analogy, which protects status. For example, the district
court in Cammemnmer v. Aspin rejected the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in
Padula v. Webster which held that discrimination against gay persons is
constitutionally permissible because "the conduct... defines the class":1
23
"[Robinson and Powell] stand for the proposition that status and conduct
are distinct, and that it is inherently unreasonable to presume that a
certain class of persons will violate the law solely because of their
orientation or status." 124
In Watkins v. United States Army, the Ninth Circuit relied in part upon
Robinson to address the government's argument that Hardwick foreclosed
Sergeant Perry Watkins' equal protection challenge to the military's
discharge policy."2 The court distinguished Hardwick, which it described
as "a 'conducte case," 126 from Robinson, which protected the status of
narcotics addiction "even though the state could criminalize [narcotics]
use.., conduct in which narcotics addicts by definition are prone to
engage."" 7 Similarly, on a motion to temporarily enjoin the Navy from
discharging the plaintiff based upon his sexual orientation, the district
court in Selland v. Aspin remarked that "the Supreme Court may well
invoke the Robinson precedent to condemn inferences of conduct from an
unpopular condition ... as distinguished from proven illegal
acts .... ,"s In addition, Laurence Tribe suggested that pursuant to
Robinson and Powell, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments may forbid
penalization of same-sex orientation and same-sex conduct.'
122. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
123. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
124. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The Camenmeyer
court also relied upon a subversive advocacy decision, Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964), for this proposition. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
125. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 624, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1989).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993). See also Dahl v. Secretary of
the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (citing Robinson for
proposition that discharge policy impermissibly targets gay persons in absence of
proscribed conduct).
129. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1424-25 n.32. For an extended analysis of the argument
that Robinson and Powel proscribe the criminalization of sodomy, see Millman, supra
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2. Protection for "Status" or "Propensity"
Pro-equality advocates can argue that the Supreme Court's status
decisions refute the government's claim !" that it is constitutionally
permissible for the 1994 Directives to discharge servicemembers based
upon a presumed propensity to commit misconduct. Included within the
Supreme Court's conception of status in Robinson and Powell is the notion
of status as a propensity or desire to engage in misconduct. Similarly,
Francisco Valdes has argued that pro-equality advocates should rely upon
Robinson, reasoning that the Supreme Court protected Robinson's status
even though "the evidence of status [Robinson's needle tracks] was much
more strongly probative of likely unlawful conduct than in the sexual
minority cases.""" He further argues that "[b]oth Robinson and Powell
prohibit[] penalization based on 'propensity' because 'propensity' is
StatUS."
5 2
Consistent with Valdes' argument, even Justice Harlan in his carefully
circumscribed Robinson concurrence'" concluded that it is impermissible
to criminalize a propensity or desire to act "[A]ddiction alone cannot
reasonably be thought to amount to more than a compelling propensity to
use narcotics [so that] the effect of [the trial judge's] instruction was to
authorize criminal punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal
act."' 4  Accordingly, even though Robinson's addiction may have
constituted evidence of prior criminal conduc" and a propensity to
commit illegal acts-the Supreme Court refused to allow the government
to bootstrap indications of "propensity' as a substitute for evidence of
proscribed conduct.
Pro-equality advocates can argue that the 1994 Directives fly in the
face of Robinson and Powell by substituting indications of "propensity" for
evidence of prohibited acts. Section H.L.b(2) of the 1994 regulations
create a rebuttable presumption-based solely upon a servicemember's
statement identifying herself as gay-that the member has a propensity to
engage in same-sex conduct."' Justice Black's concurring opinion in
note 2.
130. For a discussion of the government's defense of the rebuttable presumption in
the 1994 Directives, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
131. Valdes, supra note 2, at426.
132. Id. at 468.
133. Justice Harlan rejected the broader proposition that, as a general matter, "it
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment for the State to subject narcotics addicts
to its criminal law." Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 678 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Instead, he focused upon the evidentiary requirement of an act, which
he found to be absent in the statut6 at issue in Robinson, id. at 678-79, but present in
the statute at issue in PowelL Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 538 (1968).
134. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 678 (Harlan, J., concurring).
135. See supra text accompanying note 100 (discussing needle marks on Robinson's
arm as probative of prior illegal drug use).
136. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (describing rebuttable
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Powell, however, flatly rejects the penalization of propensity: "Punishment
for a status is particularly obnoxious... because it involves punishment for
a mere propensity, a desire to commit an offense."'"
3. An Evidentiary Barrier Between Status and Conduct
Justice Black based his reasoning in Powell partially upon evidentiary
grounds: "Evidence of propensity can be considered relatively unreliable
and more difficult for a defendant to rebut; the requirement of a specific
act thus provides some protection against false charges."I" Valdes
similarly has argued that Robinson and Powell erect an evidentiary barrier
against presumptions about one's conduct based upon one's status."' In
the military context, pro-equality advocates can argue that the government
is constitutionally required to erect an evidentiary barrier in the 1994
Directives and cannot simply rely upon an assumed propensity to commit
proscribed conduct. Advocates can point to the difficulty of refuting the
1994 Directives' rebuttable presumption, a difficulty which senior Pentagon
officials have acknowledged.Y°
Advocates can point out the extreme evidentiary difficulties faced by
servicemembers such as Corporal Blaesing, who stated that he may be gay,
but who was still questioning his sexual orientation. Such
servicemembers must somehow prove-without necessarily knowing the
answer themselves-that they do not have a propensity to engage in same-
sex conduct. Particularly in a situation such as Blaesing's, pro-equality
litigators could look to Justice Black's pronouncement that mere desire
may not be punished: 'Vhen a desire is inhibited it may find expression in
fantasy; but it would be absurd to condemn this natural psychological
mechanism as illegal."'
4
C. Pro-Equality Rejection of Robinson and Powell
Although there are some strategic reasons for pro-equality advocates
to invoke the Robinson/Powell analogy when challenging the exclusionary
policy, any benefits from this invocation are outweighed by three
significant drawbacks. First, Powell "is regarded as having all but overruled
Robinson."1'' The government can rely upon Powell to argue that the
presumption's conflation of status and conduct).
137. Powel 392 U.S. at 543 (Black, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. Valdes, supra note 2, at 391-95.
140. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (explaining why the presumption is
virtually irrebutable).
141. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing Blaesing's actual
discharge as well as the personnel training manual's suggested response).
142. Powel, 392 U.S. at 543-44 (quoting Glanville Williams, Criminal Law-the
General Part 1 (1961)).
143. Kate Stith, Tribute: Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal liberals, 103 Yale
L.J. 19, 33 n.105 (1993).
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Constitution permits discharge for all conduct, including identifying
oneself as gay. Second, the Powell Court refused to denominate public
drunkenness as a status in part due to the limited scientific knowledge
concerning the nature of alcoholism; the scientific knowledge concerning
the nature of sexual orientation is similarly limited. Reliance on Powell may
encourage courts to defer protection of sexual orientation as a status until
more complete scientific information is available. Finally, and most
importantly, the invocation of Robinson and Powell is likely to evoke the
stigmatic comparison of same-sex orientation with addiction, mental illness,
and an irresistible compulsion to engage in sex. These associations are so
damaging and deeply rooted -that pro-equality advocates should eschew
reliance on the Robinson/Powell analogy even assuming the precedent was
supportive.
1. Powell Severely Curtails Robinson
As one commentator wrote shortly after the Supreme Court decided
Powell, legal scholars had "freely predicted the [Powell] Court would
hold... that the Eighth Amendment... prohibits... any punishment at
all for public drunkenness of a chronic alcoholic. " 1 The Robinson
Court's holding that a state may not cnminalize the status of addiction
would seem to suggest that a state likewise may not criminalize an addict
for being drunk or high. Even Justice White, in his Powell concurrence,
reasoned that "[i]f it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion
to use narcotics, I do not see how it can constitutionally be a crime to yield
to such a compulsion."1' In light of these sentiments, the Powell plurality
startled many by distinguishing, Powell as a conduct case, limiting Robinson
to instances in which "no conduct of any kind is involved."'4 For
instance, Justice White distinguished Powell from Robinson on the ground
that Powell committed an act-the act "of being drunk in a public
place."''4 The juxtaposition of Robinson and Powell thus illustrates a
significant weakness of the distinction between status and conduct: An
unstable gray area exists in which "conduct and status slip ineluctably into
one another." m
The line between the status of "being drunk" and the act of "being
drunk in public" is at worst incoherent and at best too fine to truly protect
an alcoholic's status. In a dissent joined by three others, Justice Fortas
identified the intertwined nature of status and conduct by observing that
public intoxication was a "characteristic part of the pattern of [Powell's]
144. George F. Bason, Jr., Chronic Alcoholism and Public Drunkenness-Quo
Vadimus Post Powell, 19 Arm. U. L Rev. 48, 48 (1970).
145. Powel 392 U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 542 (Black, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 549 (White, J., concurring).
148. Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on
the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643, 1644
(1993).
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disease." 49 Justice Fortas asserted that Powell's conviction should have
been overturned because the defendant's status as an alcoholic inevitably
led him to appear drunk in public.'o In his concurrence, Justice White
likewise conceded that alcoholic status may be inextricably bound with
public intoxication in some situations: (1) when "[the alcoholic] becomes
so drunk that he loses the power to control his movements and for that
reason appears in public";' or (2) when the alcoholic is homeless and
lacks a private place in which to drink 52
The juxtaposition of Robinson and Powell thus suggests a narrowly
circumscribed and highly fact-based understanding of status, which may fail
to protect many discharged gay servicemembers. For example, Justice
White simply did not believe as a factual matter that Powell was unable to
avoid appearing drunk in public: "Powell had a home and a wife, and if
there were reasons why he had to drink in public or be drunk there, they
do not appear in the record." 53 Such reasoning may provide an
argument for the government in the military discharge decisions. Since the
1994 Directives categorize coming out as "homosexual conduct,"'- the
government could invoke Powell and claim that a servicemember's
statement that she is gay constitutes not the status of "being gay," but the
conduct of "being gay in public." Moreover, if courts hold that coming out
constitutes conduct, the basis for many challenges to the policy would be
eviscerated.' 5
2. Etiology of Sexual Orientation
An additional reason to reject reliance upon the Robinson/Powell
analogy is to obviate the need for a discussion of the etiology of sexual
orientation. In Powel, the limited knowledge concerning the nature of
alcoholism contributed to the Supreme Court's decision to uphold
149. Powell 392 U.S. at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 568 (stating that Powell "was powerless to avoid drinking" and that
"'he had an uncontrollable compulsion to drink'") (Fortas,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
For a discussion of the stigmatic impact which Powelts "uncontrollable compulsion" inquiry
may have in sexual orientation cases, see infra at notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
151. Powell 392 U.S. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 551.
153. Id. at 553.
154. See supra notes 3644 and accompanying text.
155. Most of the recent challenges to the anti-gay policy have been made by
servicemembers who had merely stated they were gay, with no evidence that the
servicemember had engaged in same-sex acts. See, ag., Meinhold v. United States Dep't of
Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (discharging member solely for statement acknowledg-
ing same-sex orientation); Steffan v. Aspin, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); Able v.
United States, 847 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F.
Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (same); Dahl v. Secretary of United States Navy, 830 F. Supp.
1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
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Powell's conviction. The Powell plurality devoted nearly fifty percent of its
opinion to this issue, tee repeatedly emphasizing the medical profession's
lack of consensus concerning alcoholism's causation,'5 7  manifesta-
tions,158 and treatment."9 Rejecting Powell's argument that the public
intoxication statute criminalized his status as an alcoholic, the Court stated,
"[I] t goes much too far on the basis of too little knowledge .... We know
very little about... Powell's drinking problem, or indeed about alcoholism
itself."' 6 ° Given the Powell plurality's intense focus on the nature of
alcoholism, invocation of Powell in gay-rights litigation is almost certain to
raise similar questions concerning sexual orientation.
To date, little is known about the etiology of sexual orientation:
Scientific studies concerning causation are inconclusive and controvert-
ed.' The Supreme Court rejected Powelrs claim that alcoholism is a
status. Challenges invoking the Robinson/Powell analogy in the context of
the military's policy may well suffer the same fate. At the very least, pro-
equality litigators are likely to become entangled in a presently
unresolvable side-issue. In fact, Justice Black in Powell expressed frustration
over the emphasis placed on the inquiry into alcoholism's causation,
objecting that the arguments "read more like a highly technical medical
critique than an argument for deciding a question of constitutional
law .... ,162 Moreover, because there are currently no answers to the
etiology question, judges would be free to substitute their own
(mis)conceptions for scientific act.'
6 '
156. Powel4 392 U.S. at 521-31 (plurality opinion). The Court's opinion, which was 23
pages long, discussed the current knowledge of the nature of alcoholism for approximately 10
pages. Id.
157. Id. at 521-26.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 526-31.
160. Id. at 521-22.
161. Some scientific studies may suggest a link between genetics and sexual
orientation. See, &g., Laura S. Allen & Roger A. Gorski, Sexual Orientation and the
Size of the Anterior Commissure in the Human Brain, 89 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. USA 7199
(1992);J. Michael Bailey & Richard C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation, 48
Archives Gen. Psychiatry 1089 (1991); Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA
Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, Science, July 16, 1993, at 321;
Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, Science, Aug. 30, 1991, at 1034.
For a thorough critique of the use of genetics studies in the pro-gay legal argument
from Immutability, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology. A
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (1994). Moreover, some
recent research suggests that environment has a significant impact upon one's sexual
orientation. See Martin S. Weinberg et al., Dual Attraction: Understanding Bisexuality 7-8
(1994) (relying upon research on bisexuality and concluding that sexuality is fluid, changing
over time and with situations).
162. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 538 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
163. For example, in Steffan v. Cheney, Judge Gasch rejected the plaintiffs claim
based in part upon thejudge's assumption that "some people exercise some choice in their own
sexual orientation .... "Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6-7 n.12 (D.D.C. 1991) (emphasis
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3. Medicalization of Same-Sex Orientation
The final and most significant reason to reject reliance upon Robinson
and Powell is that both decisions discuss status in terms of addiction, mental
illness, and an irresistible compulsion to engage in prohibited conduct-all
three of which have long been stigmatically associated with same-sex
orientation.'6 These comparisons to same-sex identity are potent because
they have been prevalent since the nineteenth century's "medicalization" of
165same-sex orientation. While litigators could attempt to minimize the
chance that such comparisons will arise by merely referring to the
decisions without discussion, the court or government may engage in a
more extensive treatment of the cases. At the very least, mentioning the
decisions' holdings will require reference to alcoholism and drug
addiction, which frequently are compared with same-sex orientation.
a. Same-Sex Orientation as an Addiction
Comparisons of same-sex orientation to alcoholism and other
addictions abound. Canon Barger of the Trinity Cathedral in Omaha,
Nebraska wrote, "[W]e don't know much about the developmental
sequence of either [alcoholism or homosexuality]." 66 He carried the
association one step further and recommended using alcohol rehabilitation
programs as a model for treating homosexuality.67 Similarly, in a letter to
Newsweek magazine, Peter Langmuir stated that "describing homosexuality
as an acceptable alternative lifestyle is like encouraging the alcoholic to
return to the bottle. " '6e Same-sex orientation has also been compared to
crack cocaine and tobacco addiction.'69 A New York City school board
member who opposed the proposed Rainbow Curriculum (which included
a discussion of children with gay parents) publicly stated, "We have a
number of children ... whose parents are crack addicts. Are we supposed
to tell them that that's OK?"170
The pathologizing trope of same-sex orientation follows openly-gay
in original), reo'd sub nom Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated for reh'g en ban,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 7, 1994).
164. For a detailed exploration of categorical biases and stereotypes, see Larry
Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, References,
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L Rev. 149, 157-89 (1992) (examining various types
of preferences and resulting discrimination).
165. Theodore R. Sarbin, Defense Personnel Security Research and Education
Center (PERSERE), Homosexuality and Personnel Security 1, 14 (1991), in Homosexu-
ality and the Military, supra note 53 [hereinafter 1991 PERSEREC Report].
166. Bruce Bawer, A Place at the Table 98 (1993).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 97-98.
170. Id. at 97.
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litigants into the courtroom. The plaintiff in Steffan v. Aspin,1 7' for
example, chose to address the medicalization of homosexuality head-on by
submitting to the district court the affidavit of Dr. Gregory Herek, which
discussed contemporary studies indicating that there is no relation between
same-sex identity and psychopathology.1 2 Steffan also submitted evidence
that other unpopular minorities, such as African-Americans and Jews,
similarly have been stigmatized as suffering from unique physical and
mental illnesses .17 Because the holdings of Robinson and Powell concern
addiction, invocation of the analogy would introduce these disturbing
comparisons directly into the litigation.
b. Same-Sex Orientation as a Disease or Mental Illness
The Robinson court compared California's criminalization of narcotics
addiction to "mak[ing] it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill,
or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease."'74 Same-sex
orientation likewise has been associated with illness. Historians estimate
that the birth of the medical or psychiatric model of same-sex love
occurred in the late 1800s. 75 As Theodore Sarbin explained in a report
prepared at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: "The
creation and elaboration of disease theories was based upon the all-
encompassing notion that every human action could be accounted for
through the application of the laws of chemistry and physics. In this
context, homosexuality... [was] construed as sickness.
'17
The pathologizing view of same-sex orientation has become deeply
rooted in society. In 1933, homosexuality was officially listed as a mental
illness in the precursor to the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-I)."' As early as 1935, Sigmund
Freud expressed the opinion that same-sex orientation was not a
sickness;'78 nonetheless, it was not until 1973 that the American
Psychiatric Association retracted its view of homosexuality as a mental
illness.Y
171. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated for reh'g en banr, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9977 (D.C. Cir.Jan. 7,1994).
172. See Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 129, 132-35 (discussing homosexuality and
Its relationship to psychology).
173. Id. at 129.
174. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
175. See, e.g., 1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 43 (Robert Hurley trans.,
1978) (stating that the mental illness model of homosexuality arose in 1870).
176. 1991 PERSEREC Report, supra note 165, at 14.
177. Id. at 15. The DSM-I was published in 1952. Id.
178. Id. (quoting letter from Freud to mother of homosexual son).
179. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 129. In 1975, the American Psychological
Association (APA) passed a resolution supporting the psychiatrists' action. Id. Nearly
two decades later, in 1991, the APA passed a resolution condemning the military's
exclusionary policy. Id.
1006 [1995]
OF COMMUNISM, TREASON, AND ADDICTION
While the retraction was a significant victory for the gay rights movement,
some physicians continue to subscribe to the mental illness model, viewing
same-sex love as a "personality disorder at best and a mental illness at
wors" 
1 80
Invocation of Robinson and Powell may spur this stigmatizing
association to the front of the minds of the judges deciding military
discharge cases. In addition, the government may attempt to use the
pathologizing trope to its advantage. The government did so in Steffan v
Aspin, 81 when it relied on the discredited writings of therapist Paul
Cameron, who reportedly resigned from the American Psychological
Association to avoid an ethics investigation."
c. Same-Sex Orientation as an Irresistible Compulsion
i. "Irresistible Compulsion" in Robinson and Powell
In attempting to determine whether Powell's alcoholic status required
reversal of his conviction, the plurality and both concurrences looked to
whether Powell suffered from "an irresistible compulsion" to drink 8 '
The pervasiveness of the "irresistible compulsion" inquiry makes it difficult
to discuss the decision without referring to this language. For example,
Laurence Tribe quoted Justice Powell's concurrence which stated that "it
cannot be a crime 'to yield' to 'an irresistible compulsion"' to support the
argument that "even a day in jail for engaging in sexual intimacies
inherent in homosexual orientation might violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." 18 The rationale underlying constitutional
protection of an "irresistible compulsion" is, in the words ofJustice Fortas'
dissent, that Powell "was powerless to avoid drinking."1 8s
180. An anti-gay physician, D. L Forston, included this comment in his letter to
The New Republic. Bawer, supra note 166, at 96.
181. Brief for Appellees at 40-41, Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-
5409) (on file with author).
182. The charges against Dr. Cameron were related to the medical/psychological
model of same-sex orientation: They included that Cameron consistently misrepresent-
ed research data on same-sex orientation and that he reported to a Nebraska
newspaper a fabricated account that a gay man had sexually mutilated a child. Baker
v. Wade, 106 F.R.D. 526, 537 n.31 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (citations omitted). Additional
charges of unethical conduct include that Cameron made inaccurate and inflamma-
tory public statements about gay persons. Id. At least two federal courts have
discounted Cameron's testimony. For example, the district court in Baker v. Wade stated
that "[t]here has been no fraud or misrepresentations except by Dr. Cameron, the supposed
'expert'" Id. at 536. See also Gay Student Servs. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1330
(5th Cir. 1984) (noting that "[tihe speculative evidence offered by the defendants' experts
[including Cameron]" was unsupported by any empirical basis).
183. See, eg., Powell 392 U.S. at 535 ("irresistible compulsion") (plurality opinion); id.
at 544 ("compulsion" and "irresistible impulse") (Black, J., concurring); id. at 548
("irresistible compulsion") (White, J., concurring).
184. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1424-25 n.32.
185. Poweg4 392 U.S. at 568 (stating that Powell "had an uncontrollable
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One significant drawback to the Robinson/Powell analogy is that pro-
equality advocates could be placed in the awkward position (for many) of
arguing that lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men are "powerless to avoid"
being gay. Such an assertion raises the issue of sexual orientation's
etiology, discussed above, 8 " and implicitly suggests that being gay is an
undesirable condition which nonheterosexuals would like to change. Even
if advocates did not directly make such arguments, the), nevertheless must
confront the social reality that gay persons are frequently portrayed as
suffering from an irresistible compulsion to seek sexual gratification
incessantly and to prey upon young children.'8 The language in Powell
may elicit these negative associations in the minds of presiding judges.
ii. "Irresistible Compulsion" Stigma Applied to
Lesbians, Bisexuals, and Gay Men
The view of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men as hypersexual has
persisted for years despite its factual repudiation. In 1964, for example, the
Florida Legislature published a report which portrayed "the homosexual"
as an uncontrolled sexual predator who molests the young. The Report
warned, "Keep your hands off our children! The consequences will be
terrible if you do not!'" During the McCarthy era, the Senate issued a
similar report which noted, "These perverts will frequently attempt to
entice normal individuals to engage in perverted practices. This is
particularly true in the case of young and impressionable people .... "18
The stereotype surfaced again in the 1970s, when Anita Bryant suggestively
entitled her crusade to repeal a Florida gay civil rights ordinance, "Save
Our Children."'"9 Bryant also ran an advertisement stating that gay
people engaged in "a hair-raising pattern of recruitment and outright
seductions and molestations."' 9'
Little has changed in the 1990s. In the recent backlash against gay
civil rights protection, some anti-gay ballot initiatives contain language
comparing gay persons to child molesters. Oregon's Initiative 9, which was
defeated in 1992, provided that "homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism, and
masochism [are] abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse ....92
compulsion to drink") (Fortas, J., dissenting).
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing debate about scientific
studies, which suggest a link between genetics and sexual orientation).
187. See generally Herek Affidavit, supra note 51 (concluding that there is no basis
for the belief that gay persons are sexually predatory).
188. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, Homosexuality and Citizenship in
Florida (1964), in Government versus Homosexuals (Jonathan Katz ed., 1975).
189. S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
190. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the United States, 29 Harv.
C.R.-C.L L. Rev. 283, 284 nn.10-11 (1994).
191. Id.
192. William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-election Antigay Ballot Initiative Challenges, 55
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Similarly, a proposed amendment to Arizona's Constitution would
proscribe statutes which protect persons of "pedophile, .homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual orientation."
19
iii. "Irresistible Compulsion" in Litigation
In military ban litigation, some plaintiffs have directly confronted the
"irresistible compulsion" stereotype by way of expert testimony.194 The
most significant evidence comes from the Department of Defense [DOD]
itself. The DOD's own 1988 PERSEREC Report, for example, concedes that
the military policy is grounded upon the factually insupportable notion
that gay persons have an irresistible compulsion to engage in sexual
activity:
Buried deep in [the justifications of those who support the
exdusionary policy] is the fearful imagery of homosexuals
polluting the social environment with unrestrained and wanton
expressions of deviant sexuality. It is as if persons with
nonconforming sexual orientations were always indiscriminately
and aggressively seeking sexual outlets. All the studies... that we
have seen lead to contrary inferences.'95
Nonetheless, the military continues to invoke this misperception. In 1990,
Vice Admiral Donnell stated that "young, often vulnerable female sailors"
would be prey to "subtle coercion or outright sexual advances by more
senior and aggressive female sailors." 19 As the plaintiff in Steffan
indicated, however, the "hypersexual" stereotype similarly has been applied
to other disfavored groups, such as African-Americans and Jews.'9
Reliance on the Court's status decisions may reinforce an
association-in the minds of judges or litigants-that gay people suffer
from a sexual "irresistible compulsion." For instance, in a discussion of
information that is potentially damaging, but not easily verifiable, Chief
Judge Wald compared mental illness with "child abuse... a homosexual
Ohio St. L.J. 581, 647 (1994).
193. Id. at 629.
194. See, eg., Herek Affidavit, supra note 51 (concluding that there is no basis for
the belief that gay persons are sexually predatory).
195. Theodore R. Sarbin & Kenneth E. Karols, Defense Personnel Security Research
and Education Center (PERESEC), Nonconforming Sexual Orientation in the Military
and Society 31 (1988).
196. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 128.
197. Steffan made similar submissions to the district and appellate courts. See
Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 128 (stating that "empirical data indicate that in
fact gay men are no more likely than heterosexual men to molest children")
(submission to district court); Brief of Appellant for Rehearing En Banc at 22 n.13,
Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (No. 91-5409) (on file with author) (relying
on evidence in record that other disfavored groups, such as African-Americans and
Jews, have in the past also been branded as hypersexual) (submission to appellate
court).
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relationship... [and] Communist associations.""' Moreover, the
Robinson decision already has been invoked to argue that a child molester
cannot be convicted for molestation where the defendant suffered from an
"irresistible compulsion" to molest children." Invoking the mental illness
model of homosexuality, the government, in challenges to its anti-gay
policy, could use the Robinson/Powdl analogy to argue that protecting
same-sex orientation may require the military to admit into its ranks other
groups considered sexually deviant, such as child molesters or rapists. The
Justices in Robinson oo and Powell 2 ' were particularly concerned that
these decisions contain a limiting principle; this concern may similarly
prove to be a stumbling block for judges presiding over challenges to the
military's anti-gay policy.
III. THE ANALOGY TO SuBvERsivE ADVOCACY DECISIONS
In holding the military's exclusionary policy unconstitutional, two
federal courts recently relied upon the Supreme Court's subversive
advocacy decisions involving the Smith Act and the Subversive Activities
Control Act ("SACA). The D.C. Circuit panel in Steffan v. Aspin and the
district court in Cammermeyer v. Aspin looked to the Supreme Court's
assertion that-absent some form of conduct-Communist Party
membership and adherence to the Communist creed may not be
criminalized. 2 Reflecting the focus upon Party membership and political
dissent, the subversive advocacy analogy incorporates a conception of same-
sex orientation as akin to group membership and political expression.
While the "membership" and "expression" formulations are two
strands of the subversive advocacy analogy, they are sufficiently distinct to
merit separate attention. The view of homosexuality as group membership
is similar to the view of same-sex orientation as a status under Robinson and
PowelL Indeed, the premise of the membership and Robinson/Powell
198. Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 704-05 (D.C. ar. 1987) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting). The stigmatic association of gay persons with Communists is discussed
infra at part III.
199. United States v. Johnson, No. 88-3041, 1988 WL 122561, at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. Nov.
17, 1988) (rejecting "status" defense and affirming conviction for child molestation in
an unpublished opinion).
200. The Robinson majority expressly stated, as a limiting principle, that a state still
retained the power to regulate drug trafficking in a variety of ways. Robinson, 370 U.S.
at 664.
201. See, e.g., Powel( 392 U.S. at 534 (discussing concern that there is no limiting
principle to prevent defendant's reasoning from excusing other criminal behavior
committed while drunk).
202. The courts in Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.M 57, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and
Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (WD. Wash. 1994) invoked two cases which
reject the penalization of Communist Party membership in the absence of proscribed
conduct- Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (concerning SACA), and
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (concerning the Smith Act).
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analogies is the same: It is constitutionally forbidden to criminalize one's
status or group membership based solely upon a presumption that the
members have a propensity to commit misconduct. The expression analogy
turns largely on the idea that coming out in the context of a
governmentally prescribed anti-gay policy is a form of political dissent
2 3
This Part evaluates the merits and difficulties associated with the
membership and expression strands of the subversive advocacy analogy. It
concludes that while advocates may be able to extract a few pro-equality
arguments from the SAGA and Smith Act decisions, the utility of the
arguments is far outweighed by the reasons to reject reliance upon the
analogy. First, the subversive advocacy precedent is weak and likely to
boomerang, becoming a tool for the government in military discharge
litigation. Second, even assuming that the precedent was stronger,
advocates nonetheless should reject the analogy since reliance upon the
McCarthy era decisions is likely to invoke the longstanding, stigmatic
associations of gay persons with Communists.
A. Pro-Equality Reliance Upon the Subversive Advocacy Decisions
The pro-equality argument based on group membership is thatjust as
the military's exclusionary policy singles out nonheterosexuals for
discharge, so SAGA and the Smith Act singled out members of the
Communist Party for persecution. The group membership analogy posits
that, just as the Supreme Court rejected the penalization of Party
Membership in the absence of illegal conduct, so it would reject the
military's penalization of same-sex orientation in the absence of proscribed
conduct. The argument based on the understanding of same-sex
orientation as political expression looks to the potential criminalization of
unpopular belief by the Smith Act and SACA. Pro-equality invocation of
the expression analogy emphasizes the Supreme Court's requirement of
advocacy of action-rather than advocacy of belief-to convict a defendant
of subversive advocacy. As examined in Part III.B, however, reliance upon
either strand of the subversive advocacy decisions is fraught with pitfalls.
1. Same-Sex Orientation as Group Membership
In the Steffan panel decision and the Cammerneyer case, the courts
relied upon two subversive advocacy decisions which most directly address
the penalization of group membership: Scales v. United States, involving the
Smith Act,2 04 and Aptheher v. Secretary of State, concerning SACAY5 These
opinions may augur the beginning of a trend towards judicial application
of the subversive advocacy analogy to the military discharge decisions. In
203. See supra notes 33-35, 75-76 (discussing the 1994 Directives as a symbol of public
subordination and a deterrent to political expression).
204. Scales 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
205. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
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Steffan , the panel relied upon the Smith Act and SACA cases to support
its conclusion that it is impermissible to presume that members of a
certain group have a propensity to commit misconduct: "[T]he gay ban
presumes that a certain class of persons will break the law or the rules
solely because of their thoughts and desires. This is inherently unreason-
able. ,2,2 Soon thereafter-in strikingly similar language-the Cammermeyer
court referred to Apther for the proposition that "it is inherently
unreasonable to presume that a certain class of persons will violate the law
solely because of their orientation or status."207
a. Necessity of "Active" Memb ship for Criminal Liability
The Smith Act, officially entitled "the Alien Registration Act," was
passed in June 1940.208 A Supreme Court challenge to the Smith Act's
membership clause was presented in Scales and its companion case, Noto v.
United States . 209 The membership clause provided: "Whoever... becomes
or is a member of, or affiliates with any [I society [which teaches the
necessity of violent governmental overthrow] ... knowing the purposes
thereof-Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both .... ,,21
The Court in Scales expressly held that conviction pursuant to the
membership clause required the elements of "active" membership and
specific intent, specifying that "the heavy penalties imposed by the Smith
Act" did not apply to "nominal [Communist Party] membership." As a
matter of doctrine, at least,2 12 the Court rejected the notion that an
individual could be prosecuted based solely upon Party membership: "In
our jurisprudence, guilt is personal .... 21 5
206. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
207. Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
208. It acquired its popular name based upon one of its chief sponsors, Representa-
tive Howard Smith of Virginia. Thomas L Emerson, An Essay on Freedom of Political
Expression Today, 11 Law. Guild Rev. 1, 1 (1951).
209. On the same day that it decided Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961),
the Supreme Court decided Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), which also
involved the Smith Act's membership clause. The Court discussed the bulk of its reasoning
In Scales and addressed only the sufficiency of the evidence in Noto. Noto, 367 U.S. at 291
(stating that the defendant's statutory and constitutional challenges were disposed of by the
opinion in Scales).
210. Scales, 367 U.S. at 205 n.1 (quoting 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1946), amended
as 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970)).
211. Scals, 367 U.S. at 222. Despite this cautionary note, the Court affirmed Scales'
six-year sentence of imprisonment. Id. at 222 n.14.
212. For a discussion of the difficulties with pro-gay reliance upon Scales, see infra
notes 280-89 and accompanying text.
213. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224.
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b. Prohibition against Implying "Propensity"from Membership
The Supreme Court also considered the penalization of Communist
Party membership in Aptheker v. Secretary of State.&214 At issue in Aptheker was
section six of the Subversive Activities Control Act, which made it a felony
for a Communist Party member to apply for or use a passport.
2
1
5
Emphasizing the impermissibility of predicting conduct from "the bare fact
of membership," the Court held the passport provision facially invalid.16
The Aptheker Court determined that section six "establishe[d] an
irrebuttable presumption that individuals who are members of the
specified organizations will... engage in activities inimical to the security
of the United States." 27 Holding section six unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion of "propensity" implicit in the section:
"'[A]ssuming that some members of the Communist Party... engaged in
illegal activities, it cannot automatically be inferred that all members...
participated in their illegal conduct."'
218
The Aptheker Court's rejection of SACA's irrebuttable presumption
could be useful to pro-equality advocates in countering the 1994 Directives'
"rebuttable" presumption that persons who have identified themselves as
gay have "a propensity to engage in... homosexual acts."2 9 That the
presumption in Aptheker was irrebuttable, while the Directives ostensibly
permit a servicemember to rebut the presumption is not an obstacle. As
discussed in Part I, pro-equality advocates have a convincing argument that
the Directives' presumption is in effect irrebuttable.220 The DOD's
training manual, for example, indicates that a servicemember who has
offered all evidence imaginable that he will not engage in same-sex
conduct nonetheless may be discharged.221 Senior Pentagon officials
likewise have conceded that it would be extremely difficult for a member
to rebut the presumption.222 The Steffan panef could have made the same
observation of the 1994 Directives that it made of their predecessor, the
1981 Directives: "[E]ven [the Smith Act] cases manifestly stop short of
allowing the kind of presumption that the Secretary [of the Navy] claims in
214. Apthekerv. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
215. Id. at 501-02. Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64
Stat. 993 (1950) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1988)), provided in part: "[I]t
shall be unlawful for any member [of the Communist Party] ... to make application
for a passport... or to use or attempt to use any such passport"
216. Apthekr, 378 U.S. at511.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 510-11 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246
(1957)).
219. 1994 Directive 1332.14, supra note 9, at § H.l.b(2).
220. See supra part LB (discussing the policy's rebuttable presumption).
221. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (discussing policy as explained in
DOD training manual).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59 (explaining why the presumption is
virtually irrebutable).
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this case: A presumption of misconduct from mere status .... ."
2. Same-Sex Orientation as Political Expression
Implicit in the pro-equality analogy to subversive advocacy is the view
that same-sex orientation is intertwined with one's thoughts and political
beliefs. The Steffan panel, for example, asserted that the predecessor to the
1994 Directives-which facially excluded persons based upon their sexual
orientation-targeted the thoughts and desires of gay persons.224 The
panel concluded that "the primary focus of the Directives is not, in fact,
the conduct itself, but the 'desire' to engage in that conduct."2 Pro-
equality commentators also have characterized same-sex orientation as akin
to political expression. For instance, Patricia Cain described "the
conceptualization of... homosexuality as a political idea."2 6 David
Richards went one step further and directly compared same-sex orientation
to dissent and subversive advocacy.
Homosexuality is today essentially a form of political, social, and
moral dissent on a par with the best American traditions of
dissent and even subversive advocacy .... Those that support
criminalization [of same-sex sodomy] find today in homosexuality
what they found before in the hfmily planning of Sanger,... the
socialism of Debs, or the Marxist advocacy of the American
Communist Party.2
a. Governmental Policing of One's Thoughts
Reliance upon the subversive advocacy analogy not only shifts the
focus away from a servicemember's conduct to her thoughts, but places the
focus on the government's power to suppress those thoughts. In the
context of the criminalization of sodomy, Laurence Tribe similarly has
attempted to shift the focus to the potentially Orwellian police power of
the government "[T]he relevant question is not what Michael Hardwick
was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but what the State of
Georgia was doing there."2 8 Tribe, like the Steffan panel, looked to the
Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia2 for the proposition that
223. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
224. The panel looked to the former policy's definition of a "homosexual" as someone
"'who ... desires to engage in... homosexual acts.'" Id. at 65 (quoting from § H.l.b(1) of
the 1981 Directives).
225. Id.
226. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va.
L. Rev. 1551, 1596 (1993).
227. David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Privacy and Homosexual Love, 14 N.Y.U.
Rev. L & Soc. Change 895, 905 (1986).
228. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1428.
229. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (stating that a person's inclinations and fantasies "are his own and
beyond the reach of government").
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one's innermost thoughts are protected from the machinations of
governmental intrusion.!" Overturning the defendant's conviction for
possession of obscene materials in his home, the Stanley Court stated, "Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds.' , 21' The Steffan panel applied Stanley to
the discharge policy, characterizing the policy as a form of mind control:
"By firing Mr. Steffan purely for his 'inclinations and fantfsies,' the
Secretary [of the Navy] seeks to exercise this very power over the minds of
those in the military.
" 2
2
b. Requirement of Advocacy of Action, Rather Than Advocacy of Belief
The pro-equality political expression argument looks to the Supreme
Court's attempt to balance the Communist Party members' potential for
violent action against the potential for suppression of their beliefs. The
Supreme Court considered the Smith Act's advocacy provisions in Dennis v.
United States 3 3 and Yates v. United States.2m In both cases, the defendants
were convicted pursuant to sections two and three of the Smith Actu for,
inter alia, conspiring to advocate and teach the duty of violent governmen-
tal overthrow.2 6 The Supreme Court construed the provisions narrowly
230. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1424-27.
231. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. Tribe suggested that the Court in Stanly placed what
may be its "most significant limitation to date" upon governmental interference with
one's thoughts. Tribe, supra note 2, at 1322.
232. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Paris Adult 7heatre 1, 413
U.S. at 67).
233. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
234. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
235. Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1946 ed.)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970)), provided, in part:
Sec. 2(a)
It shall be unlawful for any person-
(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate... or teach the duty...
of overthrowing... any government in the United States by
force or violence...
(2) ... to print, publish... any written.., matter advocating...
or teaching the duty... of overthrowing... any government
in the United States by force or violence ...
(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group... of
persons who teach, advocate or encourage the overthrow...
of any government in the United States by force or violence;
or to become a member of any such society... knowing the
purposes thereof.
Sec. 3.
It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or conspire to
commit, any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title.
See, e.g., Denni; 341 U.S. at 496-97.
236. Yates, 354 U.S. at 299; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 498. In Yates, the issue was whether the
particular application of these sections of the Smith Act was unconstitutional. Yates
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and strengthened the requirements needed for conviction.237 The
plurality in Dennis imported requirements of specific intent,' and active
advocacy even though, as the court later acknowledged, the Act did not
explicitly require either element. 9
In its discussion of Yates, the Supreme Court similarly distinguished
between advocacy of action and advocacy of doctrine,24 explaining that
"[t]he essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is addressed
must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely
to believe in something."241  The Court reasoned: "[A]dvocacy [of
doctrine], even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately lead to
violent revolution, is too remote from concrete action to be regarded as
the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action .... "242 The Steffan
panel relied upon the Supreme Court's requirements of specific intent and
active advocacy to support its pro-equality thought and political dissent
analogy: "Only with these limits did the Court uphold [the advocacy] provi-
sion[s] .... ,,243
Pro-equality advocates can also invoke the Supreme Court's
"membership clause" decisions, Scales v. United States and Noto v. United
States, which likewise address the criminalization of advocacy.2" In Scales,
the Supreme Court tightened the standard required for an advocacy
conviction. The Court specified-for the first time 2 -- that "the Smith
Act offenses, involving as they do subtler elements than are present in most
other crimes, call for strict standards in assessing the adequacy of proof
354 U.S. at 299. In Dennis the Court upheld the constitutionality of §§ 2-3. Denis, 341
U.S. at 516-17.
237. While a general principle of statutory construction is that "[the Supreme]
Court will not consider the abstract question of whether Congress might have
enacted a valid statute but instead must ask whether the statute that Congress did
enact will permissibly bear a construction rendering it free from constitutional
defects," Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964), there is no indication
In the language of the Smith Act that the legislature intended to include the
requirements of specific intent and active membership.
238. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 499 ("We hold that the statute requires as an essential
element of the crime proof of the intent -of those who are charged with' its
violation .... ").
239. Id. at 501-02; see also Yates, 354 U.S. at 318-20.
240. See generally Yates, 354 U.S. at 318-27.
241. Id. at 324-25.
242. Id. at 321-22.
243. Steffan, 8 F.3d at 66.
244. The membership clause, § 2(a)(3) of the Smith Act, is quoted supra note 235.
Another portion of the membership provision, not quoted above, prohibits the
organization of, or membership in an organization that "teach[es], advocate[s],
advise[s) or abet[s]" governmental overthrow. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203,
205 n.1 (1961).
245. The Scales majority conceded that the Supreme Court had failed in Yates to
specify that a stricter standard of proof vras required. "[This requirement was] not
articulated in the opinion, though perhaps it should have been. Scales, 367 U.S.
at 232.
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needed to make out a case of illegal advocacy.
24
The stricter standard of proof which the majority set forth in Scales
offered protection to the defendant in Noto.247 The Supreme Court
reversed Noto's conviction due to insufficient evidence: the government
had relied heavily upon excerpts from Communist texts and had failed to
present'sufficient evidence of advocacy of action.2  The Court rejected
the prosecution's equation of belief in the Communist creed with the
performance of prohibited acts: "[I] t is upon the particular evidence...
that a particular defendant must be judged, and not upon.., what may be
supposed to be the tenets of the Communist Party."249 Furthermore, the
Court explained its distinction between advocacy of belief and advocacy of
action more dearly than it had in prior opinions: "[M] ere abstract
teaching of Communist theory, including the... moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action."20
c. The Expression Analogy in Military Discharge Litigation
Pro-equality litigators and courts could invoke the Supreme Court's
protection of Communist beliefs to argue that the military's anti-gay policy
should be overturned. The Steffan panel did so, concluding: "[The armed
services have] accorded Mr. Steffan differential treatment solely because of
the content of his thoughts, as revealed by his truthful statement that he is
a homosexual .... [T]his is repugnant to the ... constitutional principles
that guard the sanctity of a person's thoughts against governmental
control .... 2," Pro-equality advocates could take this reasoning one step
further to argue that the military's prohibition against disclosing one's
sexual orientation impinges not only upon the (inward) workings of one's
mind, but also upon the (outward) expression of political dissent.
As discussed in Part I, coming out-particularly in the military context
in which the state penalizes such disclosure--is a form of political
expression.2 2 It is also a tool for attempting to effect socio-political
change.25 The anti-gay policy may deter all servicemembers, including
heterosexuals, who are supportive of gay rights from publicly contesting
the wisdom of the military's policy.2 Servicemembers additionally may
246. Id.
247. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1960) (reversing conviction).
248. Id. at 291.
249. Id. at 299.
250. Id. at 297-98.
251. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
252. See supra part I at notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra part I at note 78 and accompanying text (discussing studies that
indicate greater support for gay rights where people know someone who is openly
gay).
254. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which all
servicemembers may be deterred from publicly supporting gay rights).
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be deterred from political activities such as attending gay-rights demonstra-
tions, participating in same-sex "kiss-ins," and filing suit to challenge the
Directives.25 As Justice Frankfurter cautioned in his Dennis concurrence,
silencing dissenting views eventually may undermine the fabric of our
democracy:
[The urge to suppress a belief in Communism represents] a
danger that something may occur in our own minds and souls
which will make us no longer like the persons by whose efforts
this republic was founded and held together, but rather like the
representatives of that very power we are trying to combat
intolerant... and terrified of internal dissention.... m
B. Pro-Equality Rejection of the Subversive Advocacy Decisions
Although advocates may be able to extract a few pro-equality
arguments from the SAGA and Smith Act decisions, the reasons to reject
reliance upon the subversive advocacy analogy far outweigh the utility of
these arguments. Despite its reliance upon the Communist party cases, the
Steffan panel conceded that the decisions "are not beloved of civil
libertarians."2 7  Even during the McCarthy era, defenders of civil
liberties-including Justice Black, Justice Douglas and some commenta-
tors-suggested that the subversive advocacy prosecutions reflected
American intolerance of internal dissention.2 "
1. "Not Beloved of Civil Libertarians"
The subversive advocacy prosecutions are widely regretted and were
criticized even during the height of Red Scare tensions. In 1961, for
instance, Alexander Meildejohn rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion
that the Smith Act's restrictions on liberty are justified by the Communist
threat to national security. His words could as easily apply to the military's
current claim that statements by servicemembers that they are gay
jeopardize "unit cohesion" and hence our nation's safety.2
[W]hen "the right of national self-preservation" is allowed to
nullify the first amendment's protection of political freedom[,]
[i]t cannot be justified by any valid interpretation of the
255. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
256. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 554-55 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (quoting George F. Keenan, Where Do You Stand on Communism?, New York
Times Magazine, May 27, 1951, at 7, 53, 55).
257. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(en bane).
258. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 555 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Keenan, supra
note 256). The Smith Act dissents by Justices Black and Douglas are discussed infra
notes 265-67, 274-82 and accompanying text. As one commentator remarked in 1957,
"[The Smith Act] remains as a threat to freedom. Only Black and Douglas have spoken
out against it." The Smith Act Reconsidered, 17 Law. Guild Rev. 85, 88 (1957).
259. See infra part HLB.3 (a-c) (discussing view of Communists and gay persons as a
threat to national security).
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Constitution .... On the contrary, it expresses... a paranoiac
fear which... has come upon our national spirit... a paranoia
which sees human living through a blinding and distorting haze
of anxiety [and] hostility ....
As early as 1951, one commentator objected to the Smith Act's selective
targeting of the Communist Party. "[The Dennis] prosecution marks a
turning point in the history of civil liberties in America. There have been
many efforts in the past to punish particular utterances or actions. But
never before has an attempt been made to outlaw an entire political
party."26" Again, one could apply this criticism to the 1994 Directives: The
policy singles out an entire group-lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men-for
differential penalization.
Describing the Supreme Court's decisions in Scales and Noto, another
commentator faulted the opinions for "strained reasoning and
questionable judicial technique."262 The following examines the ways in
which the Supreme Court's "strained reasoning" in the subversive advocacy
cases creates numerous pitfalls for pro-equality advocates.
2. The Supreme Court's "Strained Reasoning"
a. Statutory Interpretation
From the outset, the Supreme Court gave wide latitude to Congress
when it interpreted the language of the Smith Act to require specific
intent and active advocacy.2 6S While the Steffan panel relied upon the
Supreme Court's statutory interpretation as evidence that the subversive
advocacy decisions protected belief and group membership, the panel
failed to note that the Smith Act's language did not contain these
requirements. The Supreme Court's indusion of the elements of "activity"
and "specific intene' violates a general principle of statutory construction:
"[The Supreme] Court will not consider the abstract question of whether
Congress might have enacted a valid statute but instead must ask whether
the statute that Congress did enact will permissibly bear a construction
rendering it free from constitutional defects."
2 4
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Smith Act prompted
Justice Black to remark in his Scales dissent, "the Court has practically
rewritten the statute... by treating the requirements of 'activity' and
260. Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political
Freedom, 49 Cal. L Rev. 4, 12 (1961).
261. Emerson, supra note 208, at 1.
262. Note, Judicial Techniques and the Communist Party. The Internal Security and
Smith Acts Construed, 31 U. Cin. L Rev. 152, 153 (1962).
263. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court
later acknowledged that the Smith Act did not explicitly require either element).
264. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964) (holding § 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act unconstitutional).
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'specific intent' as implicit in words that plainly do not include them."26 5
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Scales, one legal scholar likewise
objected:
The Scales decision demonstrates the lengths to which the Court
will go to save a congressional statute from unconstitutionality.
Although insertion of the element of intent had precedent in the
Dennis construction of the advocacy [clause] .... such a reading
seems less justifiable as applied to the simple fact of member-
ship .... The Court's addition of "active" seems even more
questionable.6
Another commentator hinted that the Court's interpretation, requiring
active membership, may have been disingenuous: "[Scales] is not one of
those cases where there is disagreement over the meaning of a word-both
defendant and the Court know and agree upon what a 'member' is in the
ordinary sense-but the Court simply refuses to believe that Congress
meant what it said.,
2 67
b. The Dennis Decision
i. The Plurality's Factual Determinations
The Supreme Court's application of the Smith Act to the facts of
particular cases further illustrates that-despite its articulated protection of
Communist Party membership and belief-the Court has upheld some
Smith Act convictions in the absence of illegal conduct. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Dennis did not even consider the specific acts the
defendants had committed. The Dennis plurality opened its opinion by
stating that "[w]hether... petitioners did in fact advocate the overthrow
of the Government by force and violence is not before us ..... "263
Instead, the plurality relied upon the broad conclusions set forth by the
Court of Appeals, including that: "[T]he Communist Party is a highly
disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into strategic positions [and]
use of aliases... and the general goal of the Party wa.. to achieve a
successful overthrow of the existing order by force and violence."6 9
Not all of the Justices agreed with the plurality's adoption of such
sweeping factual findings. In his concurrence, Justice Frankfurter objected,
"[W]e may not treat as established fact that the Communist Party in this
country is... conditioned to embark on unlawful activity when given the
command."20 Nonetheless, Justice Frankfurter took judicial notice of
substantially equivalent "facts," such as the assumption that "it would amply
265. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 260 (1961) (BlackJ., dissenting).
266. The Supreme Court 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L Rev. 83, 114 (1961).
267. Note, supra note 262, at 162.
268. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1950).
269. Id. at 498.
270. Id. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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justify a legislature in concluding that recruitment of additional members
for the Party would create a substantial danger to national security."2'
ii. Factual Findings Impact Presumption of Misconduct
The Dennis Court thus relied upon the generalized conclusion that
the Communist Party intended at some future time to overthrow the
government. In fact, the plurality specified that the defendants may be
convicted based upon a presumption of future illegal activity. Referring to
the "dear and present danger" test, the Dennis plurality stated, "[T]he
words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until
the putsch is about to be executed .... , 2 This reasoning supplies a
potentially powerful argument for the military in support of its
exclusionary policy: The government should not have to wait until same-
sex conduct has occurred before it can discharge servicemembers.
Although pro-equality advocates would' respond that consensual, adult
same-sex conduct poses no danger-much less a danger on par with
violent governmental overthrow-the military still may argue that same-sex
acts threaten the cohesion of the military unit, which in turn adversely
threatens national securityy
s
Pro-equality advocates must invoke the Dennis dissents, rather than the
plurality or concurring opinions, to support the proposition that
servicemembers cannot be discharged based upon a presumption of likely
future misconduct. In separate dissents, Justices Black and Douglas focused
upon the absence of a required actus reus in both the Smith Act and the
indictmen t 4Justice Black remarked:
These petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow
the Government. They were not charged with overt acts of any
kind designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even
charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to
overthrow the Government The charge was that they agreed to
assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later
date .... 2
Justice Douglas similarly objected, "If this were a case where [petition-
ers] ... were teaching the techniques of . . . assassination of the
President... [and] the planting of bombs ... I would have no doubt
271. Id.
272. Id. at 509.
273. See infra part uI.B.3 (a-c) (discussing the government's view of gay persons as a
threat to national security).
274. For the language of §§ 2-3 of the Smith Act, see supra note 235.
275. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Black, as the only free speech absolutist to sit on the Court, believed that pure
speech was entitled to absolute First Amendment protection. Conversely, he believed
that the First Amendment did not protect any form of conduct. See Hugo Black, A
Constitutional Faith 45-58 (1968).
1021
80 IOWA LAWREVIEW
[that the convictions should be affirmed].... This case was argued as if
those were the facts."' 76
Furthermore, the Dennis dissents and contemporaneous commentary
suggest that the defendants were convicted based upon their beliefs, rather
than upon any illegal activity. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, warned that
"when the illegality is made to turn on intent, not on the nature of the
act," there is a danger that defendants would be "convicted not for what
they did but for what they thought."2 7 Both Justice Douglas and a legal
commentator, Thomas Emerson, emphasized that the Smith Act bestowed
upon the government the power to intrude into one's thoughts. Emerson
asserted that Dennis and "the Smith Act open[ed] the door to widespread
suppression of new, unorthodox, or radical ideas .... 278 As discussed in
Part IV, Justice Douglas focused upon the Smith Act's suppression of belief
by comparing the Dennis convictions to the old English law of constructive
treason, in which "[m]en were punished not for raising a hand against the
king but for thinking murderous thoughts about him."27
c. The Scales Decision
As in Dennis, the Supreme Court in Scales affirmed the defendant's
conviction for conspiring to organize the Communist Party in spite of little,
if any, proof of illegal activity. While the Court concluded that "the
petitioner's own utterances and systematic course of conduct as a high
Party official 280 constituted sufficient evidence for conviction pursuant to
sections two and three of the Smith Act,28 ' Justice Douglas's dissent is
more convincing. He summarized the evidence adduced at Scales's trial
and concluded that "[n] ot one single illegal act is charged to petitioner.
That is why the essence of the crime covered by the indictment is merely
belief-belief in the proletarian revolution, belief in Communist
creed. 
, 212
i. Factual Findings Impact "Active Membership" Determination
The evidence of Scales's active membership primarily concerned his
attempts to recruit Party members by educating individuals about
Communist Party doctrine.288 Scales furnished an undercover FBI agent
276. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 583.
278. Emerson, supra note 208, at 7.
279. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
280. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 292 (1961).
281. See supra note 235 (quoting §§ 2-3 of the Smith Act, pursuant to which Dennis
was convicted).
282. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S 203, 265 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 264-65. Scales also had stated that force was the only way to achieve
revolution. Id. at 265. For the majority's discussion of the evidence at trial, see id. at 235-
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with literature criticizing the American involvement in Korea and stated
that the working class should be used to foment violent revolution.2 The
activity in the record which came closest to an illegal action-showing
students how to kill a person with a pencil-was a demonstration by a third
party; Scales was merely present.28 Scales's presence at the demonstra-
tion is arguably several steps removed from the traditional concept of a
criminal actus reus. it was a (1) third-party observation, (2) of an instructor
teaching students, (3) how to commit illegal conduct (assuming "pencil
murders" are possible), (4) for potential use, (5) at some unspecified time
in the future.
As with the fine line in Robinson and Powell between "being drunk"
and "being drunk in public," Scales's conviction illustrates that the
distinction between "active" and "nominal" Communist Party membership
is easily blurred. If, as Justice Douglas concluded in his Scales dissent, the
evidence which suffices for "active" Party membership looks largely
indistinguishable from that which characterizes "nominal" membership,
then Scales was convicted for his political affiliation: "We legalize today
guilt by association, sending a man to prison when he committed no
unlawful act. Today's break with tradition is a serious one. It borrows from
totalitarian philosophy."28 Since membership in the Communist Party is
inextricably linked with a belief in the tenets of Communism, the Supreme
Court seems to have countenanced the prosecution of belief.
ii. Invocation of Scales in Military Discharge Litigation
The government may invoke Scales to defend the discharge of gay
servicemembers as necessary to protect national security. The Scales
decision, like other Smith Act opinions, suggests that the state may broadly
define criminal "conduct" when there is a perceived threat to national
security.2n The military's definition of "homosexual conduct" to include
coming out may not appear to be unduly broad when compared to
Scales's conviction for attending a class on how to potentially kill a person
with a pencil. The armed services could raise the specter of national
security concerns by arguing that the inclusion of openly gay
servicemembers would impair combat effectiveness. Particularly since
President Clinton sparked debate by proposing an end to the anti-gay
51.
284. Id. at 264-65.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 263.
287. The ScaW majority emphasized the dangers posed by the Communist Party,
particularly that it advocated violent overthrow of the government. Scala, 367 U.S.
at 235-42.
288. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (describing how section H.I.b(2)
of the 1994 Directives effectively mandates discharge for a servicemember who states
that she is gay).
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policy, the military consistently has sounded the alarmed refrain of
threatened "unit cohesion"-its anxiety that the morale of heterosexual
servicemembers will be undermined, thus impacting its ability to protect
the country."s
d. The Yates Decision: Expression Still Silenced
Even the Supreme Court's Yates opinion-in which the Court
overturned the convictions of five of the fourteen defendants due to
insufficient evidence-is not a helpful precedent for pro-equality advocates.
All of the Yates defendants were forced to undergo a trial and were
convicted on the basis of little concrete evidence. Justice Black remarked
in his partial dissent that "[u]nder the Court's approach, defendants could
still be convicted simply for agreeing to talk as distinguished from agreeing
to act. '' 0 Black's fears may have materialized in Yates. Although the Yates
majority determined that sufficient evidence warranted remanding the
cases of the remaining nine defendants for retrial,21' the prosecution
eventually abandoned the charges due to insufficient evidence.s
Even though the Yates defendants' beliefs were ultimately protected,
they all had to endure an initial conviction and the majority of the
defendants had to endure re-indictment. Justice Black-echoing Justice
Douglas's dissents in Dennis and Scales---analogized this situation to the law
of constructive treason. He noted that a principal purpose of the "overt
act" requirement in the law of treason "was to keep people from being
convicted of disloyalty to government during periods of excitement when
passions and prejudices ran high, merely because they expressed
'unacceptable' views." 2s Likewise for Justice Douglas, the Yates majority
had failed to protect political dissent:
[A]fter all the expressed alarm about the peril into which the
United States was being plunged... the prosecution felt itself
unable to show persuasively that the Communist spokesmen had
engaged in forbidden incitements to illegality. This should
stimulate a sober second look at the surface attractions of
programs of suppression and coercion. 4
289. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994,
which Congress passed in the wake of the Clinton Administration's revised policy,
codifies the 1994 Directives and sets forth a Congressional finding that the presence of openly
gay servicemembers "would create an unacceptable risk to the high standard of morale, good
order, and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." 10 US.C.
§ 645(a)(15) (Supp. V 1993).
290. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 340 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
291. Id. at 327.
292. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 274 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
293, Yale.; 354 U.S. at 343 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
294. Justice Douglas was discussing the Yates decision in his dissent from Scal& &ca!e;
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3. Stigmatic Association of Communists with Lesbians, Bisexuals, and
Gay Men
Even assuming that the subversive advocacy decisions adequately
supported the argument that the discharge policy is unconstitutional, pro-
equality advocates nonetheless should reject the analogy due to the
longstanding, stigmatic association of gay people with Communists. As a
contemporary American author remarked of his childhood,
"'[H]omosexual' and 'Red' were virtual synonyms." 9 This association is
particularly potent in the military context. Since the McCarthy era, the
government has portrayed both Communists and nonheterosexuals as a
threat to national security. In military discharge litigation, the government
could seize upon this stigmatic comparison to suggest that gay people, like
Communists, cannot reliably serve in the military. Even if the government
does not directly make a national security claim, the analogy may spark
negative associations in the minds of presiding judges, especially those who
lived through the McCarthy era's demonization of the "commie-queer
.bogeyman. "096
a. Stigmatic Association with Communists in Military Discharge
Litigation
Certain judicial decisions and court hearings illustrate that the
association of gay persons and Communists persists today. Most recently
during the rehearing en bane for Steffan I, Judge Randolph analogized to
Communists when discussing the fitness of gay persons to serve in the
military. He reportedly asked Steffan's counsel, "If a C.IA. agent stands up
and says 'I am a Communist but I won't act on it while in the service,'
must the C.IA. keep him?"2 While there is no way of knowing whether
Judge Randolph's question was prompted by Steffan Is subversive advocacy
analogy, a pro-equality advocate's use of the Communist Party cases will, at
the very least, increase the probability that ajudge may equate Communists
with lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. Outside the military context, other
courts,ss including the Supreme Court, have disfavorably grouped gay
367 U.S. at 274 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Walter Gellhorn, American
Rights: The Constitution in Action (1960)).
295. Paul Monette, Becoming a Man: Halfa Life Story 26 (1992).
296. Larry Gross, Contested Closets: The Politics and Ethics of Outing 12 (1993).
297. Stephen Labaton, Administration Argues in Court for Gay Ban Clinton
Opposed, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1994, at A12.
298. See ag., Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d at 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Wald, C.J.,
dissenting), discussed supra part II.C.3.c.iii. Dissenting from an opinion which
concerned the plaintiffs denial in a job interview that she suffered from a mental illness,
Chief Judge Wald suggested other examples of potentially damaging information which are
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people with Communists. For example, in his dissent to Paul v.
Davis-involving the police's erroneous, public identification of the
plaintiff as "an active criminal"-Justice Brennan contemplated other
potential examples of "official stigmatization," including the "branding of a
person as a Communist, a traitor, an 'active murderer,' a homosexual, or
any other mark that... carries social opprobrium."2 9
b. Presumed Commonality: Threat to National Security
The equation of Communism and same-sex orientation burst forth in
full fury during the McCarthy era."' The presumed commonality
between gay persons and Communists was "a side effect of Cold War
tensions and American fears about national security."3°1 The government
in large part based its assertion that nonheterosexuals posed a security risk
upon its presumption that gay persons were more susceptible than
heterosexuals to blackmail from Communist agents. While the federal
government had been dismissing from its employ a significant number of
suspected gay persons for several years, February 1950 marks the birth of
the Cold War's "homosexual purge."so2 Several days after Senator Joseph
McCarthy claimed that the government was overrun with Communists,
Undersecretary of State John Peurifoy declared that many of the federal
employees recently dismissed for "moral turpitude" were homosexual."'
Senator Kenneth Wherry reflected the prevailing sentiment when he
commented, 'You can't hardly separate homosexuals from subversives.""
not easily verifiable, including "communist associations, homosexual relations, or child abuse."
Id.
299. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 721 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Paul
majority held that the police chief's action in distributing the flyer did not deprive the
plaintiff of any liberty or due process interests secured by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Id. at 713-14.
300. There also may have been some concern with same-sex orientation during the
1919-1920 "Red Scare." For example, the Senate launched an investigation into alleged
"[l]mmoral... [homosexual] practices" at a Naval training station. S. Rep., 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), rqprinted in Government versus Homosexuals (Katz ed., 1975). In
addition, Emma Goldman, who was the first American "to [have taken] up the defense
of homosexual love before the general public," Cain, supra note 226, at 1555 n.22
(quoting Jonathan Katz, Gay American History 378 (rev. ed. 1992)), was deported to
Russia during the Red Scare together with a woman who was reportedly Goldman's
lover. Cain, supra note 226, at 1555 nn.24-25 (citations omitted).
301. Allan B6rub6 & John D'Emilio, Archives: The Military and Lesbians During the
McCarthy Years, 9 Signs 759, 759 (1984).
302. Between 1947 and 1950 alone, the government dismissed 4,954 per-sons suspected
of being gay. Gross, supra note 296, at 13.
303. John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War
America, in Passion and Power. Sexuality in History 226, 237 (Kathy Peiss & Christina
Simmons eds., 1989).
304. Cain, supra note 226, at 1565 (citing Lillian Faderman, Odd Girls and Twilight
Lovers: A History of Lesbian Life in Twentieth Century America 143 (1991)).
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In June 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations-of which
Senator McCarthy was the ranking Republican member-launched an
inquiry into the "homosexual menace. "ss5  Six months later, the
Subcommittee issued its report, "Employment of Homosexuals and Other
Sex Perverts in Government."05 The report ascribed characteristics to
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men that were similar to those ascribed to
Communists: Both groups were believed to be immoral, desirous of
recruiting others, and a threat to national security.30° This "congruence
between the stereotype of Communists and homosexuals made the
scapegoating of gay men and women a simple matter."3'8 The Subcom-
mittee report concluded that nonheterosexuals should be barred from
government employment."
After issuance of the subcommittee report, dismissals of gay persons
from civilian and military positions increased dramatically.1 0 The trend
was exacerbated by President Eisenhower's executive order banning
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men from all federal employment.31'
Members of the House Un-American Activities Committee intensely
pressured suspected Communists to name other Party members 1 2 The
federal government, particuarly the military, employed the same tactics to
purge suspected gay persons from its ranks 33 The claim of a "homosexu-
al security risk" seems to have been wielded in part as a political weapon:
305. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 133-34.
306. S. Rep. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
307. See D'Emilio, supra note 303, at 232 (explaining that "the incorporation of gay men
and women into the demonology of the McCarthy era required little effort.").
308. See id. In fact, Harry Hay, the primary founder of the Mattachine Society-one
of the United States' earliest important gay organizations-reportedly left the Communist
Party "to avoid tarring either group [Communist or gay] with the other's stigma." Gross, supra
note 296, at 13.
309. D'Emilio, supra note 303, at 228.
310. Seeid.at 229.
311. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (1949-53), reprinted in Codification of
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders 47-53 (1989).
312. See eg., Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66 (1957) In this opinion, which is
different from the principal Yates decision discussed above, the Supreme Court affirmed
one count of contempt where the defendant had refused to identify others as
Communist. Id. Between 1945 and 1946 alone, the House Un-American Activities
Committee initiated contempt proceedings against 22 people-a dramatic increase from
Congress' prior average of less than one citation per year. Alan L Bigel, The Frst
Amendment and National Security: The Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of
Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 Ohio N.U. L Rev. 885, 889 (1993).
313. B6rub6 & D'Emilio, supra note 301, at 763 ("Investigating officers extracted [from
servicewomen] confessions [of lesbianism] with promises of speedy discharge, and then used
the self-incriminating statements to pressure women into naming names."). A few years earlier
during World War I, when the need for servicemembers was great, the military had relaxed
substantially its anti-gay policies. Id. at 761-62. The military's practice of relaxing its anti-gay
policies likewise was followed during the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian Gulf wars. See, e.g.,
Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming- Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military 17, 70, 198, 214,
295, 356, 419 (1993).
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"Republican leaders exploited the homosexual issue as a means of
discrediting the Truman administration's national security policy."""4
Moreover, 'the ability of Communists and gay persons to blend into society
also seems to have heightened fears for national security.315 Historian
John D'Emilio described the tenor of the times: "Since Communists bore
no identifying physical characteristics, they were able to infiltrate the
government .... Homosexuals, too could escape detection and thus
insinuate themselves in every branch of the government."
16
c. Repudiation of the National Security Rationale
A long history of government studies, as well as comments by high-
ranking officials, directly contradict the notion that a servicemember's
same-sex orientation threatens national security by making the member
more vulnerable to blackmail. The 1957 Crittenden Report published by
the Department of Defense concluded: "A... concept which persists
without sound basis in fact is the idea that homosexuals necessarily pose a
security risk.... Some [intelligence officers] feel that certain homosexuals
might be better security risks than heterosexuals .... "317 Even Secretary
of Defense Richard Cheney testified in 1991 that the security risk argument
was an "old chestnut."' 8 In its 1992 study on the military's discharge
policy, the General Accounting Office flatly refuted the "security risk"
rationale:
[T]wo DOD/service-commissioned study efforts have refuted
DOD's position on the potential security risk associated with
homosexual orientation as well as disclosed information that
raised questions about the basic policy. Further, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
recently acknowledged that homosexual orientation is no longera
major security concern. 1
Furthermore, there has never been a single instance of successful
"homosexual blackmail" recorded since the U.S. government created its
security clearance programs forty years ago.'2 In fact, in an Executive
Order, President Clinton recently revised federal policy to provide that
314. Brub6 & D'Emilio, supra note 301, at 759.
315. At least one author has argued that the 1948 publication of Alfred Kinsey's
report, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, "reinforced many heterosexuals' most basic fear.
the invisible, undetectable enemy was everywhere." Michael Bronsky, Culture Clash: The
Making of Gay Sensibility 77 (1984).
316. D'Emilio, supra note 303, at 232.
317. The Crittenden Report, supra note 53, at 8.
318. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 122. Cheney was testifying under oath before
the House Budget Committee on July 19, 1991. Id.
319. The 1992 Study, supra note 53, at 3. Sem also id. at 31-36 (discussing the DOD's
findings in greater detail).
320. Herek Affidavit, supra note 51, at 136.
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security clearances will no longer be denied on the basis of sexual
orientation. While the Executive Order provides that "no inference...
may be rasied solely on the basis of... sexual orientation," the security
clearance policy may conffict with the 1994 Directives. Pursuant to the
Executive Order, security clearances may be denied if federal employees
have "any concealed activity or conducC which could subject them to
"coercion or compromise." 2 2 Such concealment, however, may be
mandated by the military's "don't tel" policy.
Although the government can no longer convincingly rely upon the
notion of "homosexual blackmail," it has brought the "national security"
argument in through the back door by claiming a threat to "unit
cohesion." The Department of Defense claims that servicemembers must
be discharged for same-sex conduct because such acts threaten the
(heterosexual) troops' "standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are essential for combat effectiveness."22 As the
Steffan panel observed, the "unit cohesion" argument boils down to the
military's assumption that "heterosexual soldiers will be appalled at the
requirement that they serve alongside homosexuals," thereby reducing the
troops' effectiveness and jeopardizing national security
24
Even though the government may choose not to rely upon the claim
of "homosexual blackmail" when defending military discharge cases, it
nonetheless continues to invoke the similarly ominous possibility of
impaired combat readiness. The persistent specter of the "national
321. The Executive Order provides: "The U.S. government does not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability or sexual orientation in
granting access to classified information." Louis Freedberg, "Clinton Order Does
Away with Security Ban on Gays," San Francisco Chron., August 5, 1995, at Al (emphasis
added). Clinton's action overturns President Eisenhower's Executive Order which excluded
all gay persons from federal employment. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
322. Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton Ends Ban on Security Clearance for Gay Workers,"
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,,1995 at Al, p.9.
323. Restrictions on Personal Conduct in the Armed Forces, in Department of
Defense Directive 1304.26, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Pub. No. 605-93
(on file with author). A larger excerpt of this provision more fully illustrates the
way in which the government has neatly linked (in a 3-step process) its exclusionary
policy to ajustification of national security.
1. [M]ilitary units and personnel must maintain the high standards of
morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential
for combat effectivenes.
2. The Armed Forces must be ready at all times for uwold-wide deployment....
3. Members of the Armed Forces may be involuntarily separated before
their term of service ends for various reasons ... such as:
d. A member may be separated for... engaging in... a
homosexual act... [or] for stating that he or she is homose-ual
or bisavua! ....
Id. (emphasis added).
324. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reo'd, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
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security" claim, and the culturally embedded presumption that
Communists and gay persons present a security risk, make reliance upon
the subversive advocacy decisions an especially poor litigation tactic. A pro-
equality advocate's reliance upon the SAGA and Smith Act decisions raises
the stigmatic misperception to the forefront of a judge's mind. When
presented with the government's "unit cohesion" argument, a judge may
(as did Judge Randolph in Steffan II) jump to the conclusion that
nonheterosexuals, like Communists, can be discharged on national security
grounds.
IV. THE ANALOGY TO THE LAW OF TREASON
The criminalization of treason, like that of subversive advocacy, brings
with it the risk that the government may misuse the law to suppress
unpopular belief. The Steffan panel invoked the law of treason to support
its conclusion that the government may not discharge gay servicemembers
based solely upon their same-sex desire or thoughts.5 s This invocation of
the law of treason in gay rights litigation is premised upon the
Constitution's repudiation of the early English law of constructive treason,
in which an individual was subject to conviction and execution for
"compass[ing] or imagin[ing]" the death of the king.3 2 6 The Framers
rejected the law of constructive treason by limiting the Constitution's
treason clause, Article III, section three, to particular types of conduct and
by requiring two witnesses to the same overt act: "[Tireason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering
to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No person shall be
convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same
overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
" 52s
Drawing upon the law of treason, the Steffan panel concluded that the
restrictions in Article III, section three, "express the constitutional
principle that a person's thoughts are his own-however distasteful they
may be to the state." 28 In their Smith Act dissents, Justices Douglas and
Black similarly relied upon the repudiation of constructive treason to
support their position that the defendants had been convicted for their
political views. Dissenting in Scales v. United States, for example, Justice
Douglas stated that "[tihe crime of belief-presently prosecuted [under
the Smith Act]-is a carryback to the old law of [constructive] treason
where men were punished for compassing the death of the King." 52s
325. Id. at 66. As with the Communist Party cases, the treason analogy depends
upon a conception of same-sex orientation as akin to one's thoughts or to political
dissent. For a discussion, in the context of the subversive advocacy decisions, of same-sex
orientation as akin to thought, see supra notes 224-56 and accompanying text.
326. Steffan, 8 F.3d at 66 (quoting Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. 3 (1350)).
327. U.S. Const. art. Im, § 3.
328. Steffan, 8 F.3d at 66.
329. Scales, 367 U.S. at 266 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his Yates dissent, Justice Black
likewise invoked the law of treason. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 293, 343 (1957)
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While the Steffan panel has issued thus far the only military discharge
decision to have invoked the treason analogy, the similarity of the
reasoning underlying the treason and Smith Act decisions suggests that
increased pro-equality reliance upon the law of treason may only be a
matter of time.
This Part attempts to dissuade advocates from embarking upon that
course. While the safeguards in the treason clause have at times protected
individuals, in some instances the state has utilized the law of treason to
supress dissenting views. Furthermore, the treason analogy-like the
Robinson/Powell and subversive advocacy decisions-invokes the
longstanding association of gay persons with a stigmatized group (here,
traitors). Reliance upon the treason analogy risks evoking in the minds of
presiding judges the view of nonheterosexuals as treacherous: a view which
carries special weight in the context of military security.
A. Pro-Equality Reliance Upon the Law of Treason
This section presents historical information which tends to buoy a
pro-equality claim that, as the law of treason protects an individual from
prosecution based upon her thoughts, so the government is prohibited
from discharging a servicemember based upon her same-sex thoughts or
desires. The Framers did repudiate directly in the Constitution the law of
constructive treason and placed specific limits upon the government's
prosecutorial power. In the early treason cases, prosecutorial abuses
abounded. In later prosecutions of some politically unpopular defen-
dants--such as those of Aaron Burr in 1806 and Anthony Cramer in
1942-the law of treason seems to have protected the defendants from
prosecution for their beliefs. Even apart from the stigmatic association of
gay persons with traitors, however, the analogy is unsuitable. As discussed
in Part W.B, history suggests that the protections of the law of treason have
been sporadic at best.
1. Early English and American Law of Treason
The conclusion ofJustice Douglas, Justice Black, and the Steffan panel
that the Framers repudiated the law of constructive treason appears to be
historically accurate. Prior to the framing of the Constitution, the law of
treason was a tool used to convict persons "during periods of excitement
when passions and prejudices ran high, merely because they expressed
'unacceptable' views."8"°
a. Early English Law of Treason
The criminalization of treason originated in 1352 during the reign of
(Black, J., dissenting).
330. Yates 354 U.S. at 343 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Edward III, when the Statute of Treason was enacted.3 1 The Statute of
Treason provided for the execution of a person committing any of seven
offenses, including "compass[ing] or imagin[ing] the Death of... the
King."t3 2 In England, judicial construction consistently broadened the
application of this already vague statutory provision, resulting in the crime
of "constructive treason."553
As stated in the 1592 trial of Sir John Perrot, mere thought
alone-unaccompanied by action-was sufficient to warrant execution:
"[I]magination was in itself High-Treason, albeit the same proceeded not
to any overt fact." 4S No act was required for prosecution; thus,
"[c]onvictions were obtained... for pure speech, often for speech which
only by the most bizarre, strained construction could be found to...
reveal a threat against... the sovereign." s s Probably the most notorious
example of a constructive treason prosecution is the fifteenth century
execution of William Walker for telling a joke.5 5 Walker owned an inn
called the "Crown" and had the misfortune to remark in jest to his son,
"Tom, if thy behavest thyself well, I will make thee an heir to the
Crown."5 5 7 Holding that no proof of actual desire to kill the king was
required, the court convicted the defendant and ordered that he be hung,
drawn and quartered.3
b. Colonial Law of Treason
The colonies largely modeled their laws proscribing treason on
England's Statute of Treason.""3 The crime of constructive treason was
incorporated into the laws of eleven of the colonies; moreover, colonial
331. The Treason Act, 1352, 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c.2 (1350).
332. Id.
333. James W. Hurst, Treason Down to the Constitution, in The Law of Treason in
the United States: Collected Essays 88-89 (1971).
334. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 709 n.1 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting Trial of Sir John Perrot, 1 Sow.SLTr. 1315, 1318 (1592)). Watts had been
convicted for an act similar to treason: threatening the life of the President Watt;
394 U.S. at 705-06. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statement-that he
would refuse induction into the armed forces and that "if they ever make me carry a rifle the
first man I vrant in my sights is L.B.J.," id. at 706--did not constitute a threat against President
Johnson's life. Id. at 708.
335. Joel J. Finer, Mens Rea The First Amendment, and Threats Against the Life of
the President, 18 Ariz. L Rev. 863, 864 (1976).
336. 1 Campbell, Lives of the ChiefJustices of England 147 (1849).
337. Id. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence in Watts, noted that the Walker case,
as well as that of Thomas Burdet, discussed immediately below, were examples of the
abuses of the law of constructive treason. Watts, 394 U.S. at 709.
338. 1 Campbell, supra note 336, at 147-48.
339. Some of the earliest colonial references to the law of treason, however,
were not modeled on the Statute of Edward IIL Se, eg., Hurst, supra note 333, at 68-
69; James G. NWilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing
Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. Pitt. L Rev. 99, 107 (1983).
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definitions frequently broadened the scope of treason.m For instance,
Nicholas Bayard, a member of a defeated political faction, was tried for
treason in 1702 for circulating petitions critical of the government."'
With the advent of the Revolution, the potential for treason prosecutions
increased: many colonists simultaneously were exposed to prosecutions for
disloyalty to the king and to the colonial government.
M 2
Prior to the drafting of the Constitution's treason dause, little
evidence indicates that the revolutionaries were much concerned that the
government leaders could wield treason prosecutions as a political tool
against their enemies.' s4 In fact, the revolutionaries themselves may have
indicted nearly five hundred Quakers based upon their political beliefs and
affiliation with the British.3 The Quakers refused to take a loyalty oath
to the state of Pennsylvania, which by statute constituted "treason. " 5
Although the state seized and redistributed some of the Quakers' land,M
6
the grounds for prosecution were weak Of the five hundred indictments,
only two or three men were convicted.s 7
2. The Constitution's Treason Clause
When drafting the Constitution's treason clause, the Framers
"adopted every limitation that the practice of governments had evolved or
that politico-legal philosophy to that time had advanced."m They likely
were concerned with the potential for abuse of treason prosecutions
because they "almost to a man had.., been guilty of treason under any
interpretation of British law." 4' In his papers, for instance, Thomas
Jefferson angrily decried a British general's 1774 proclamation that a
gathering of Massachusetts residents to consider their grievances
constituted treason."- Jefferson described constructive treason as "that
deadly weapon.., which had drawn the blood of the best and honest men
in the kingdom." 5'
In creating a federal crime of treason, the Committee of Detail
340. Hurst, supra note 333, at 75-77; Wilson, supra note 339, at 107.
341. Bradley Chapin, The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early
Origins 7-8 (1964); see also Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 13 n.16 (1945).
342. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 11-12.
343. Hurst, supra note 333, at 82; Wilson, supra note 339, at 107-08.
344. Chapin, supra note 341, at 57; Wilson, supra note 339, at 110-11.
345. Wilson, supra note 339, at 110-11.
346. Id.
347. Chapin, supra note 341, at 57 (noting that all but two men acquitted);
Wilson, supra note 339, at 110-11 (noting that all but 3 men acquitted).
348. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1945).
349. Id. at 14.
350. 1 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 206, 210 (Ford ed. 1893) [hereinafter
Writings ofJefferson]; see also Wilson, supra note 339, at 111-12.
351. 1 Writings of Jefferson, supra note 350, at 216; see also Wilson, supra note 339,
at 111-12.
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rejected an initial proposal to allow Congress to define the crime.M In
fact, treason was the only crime defined in the Constitution."""
The Committee narrowly defined treason to include only "levying war
against the United States, or... adhering to [their] Enemies."3
Franklin urged further restrictions, arguing that the Framers should
include the requirements that there be two witnesses to an overt act
because "prosecutions for treason were generally virulent; and perjury too
easily made use of against innocence." s The Framers later agreed to
include the requirements " 6 They thereby "combined all of [the] known
protections and added two of their own which had no precedent
[prohibition of the creation of new treasons and the requirement that two
witnesses testify to the same overt act.]"5 7
Pro-equality advocates can assert, as has the Steffan panel,s" that the
Framers' repudiation of constructive treason exemplifies a constitutional
principle that an individual may not be penalized based upon one's
thoughts and in the absence of an overt act. The 1994 Directives'
rebuttable presumption violates this principle, advocates can argue, by
effectively mandating the discharge of servicemembers who have merely
identified themselves as gay. 59 Discharge based upon a state-
ment-particularly when it is not a statement of intent to act-bears some
resemblance to prosecutions for constructive treason. During the reign of
Edward IV, for instance, Sir Thomas Burdet was convicted of treason.,
Sir Thomas, distraught because the king had slaughtered his prized white
buck, reportedly had stated, "I wish that the buck, horns and all, were in
the belly of the man who advised the King to kill it." s ' Not only was
there no suggestion that Sir Thomas had committed an overt act, there
also was conflicting evidence as to whether he had referred to the king
(rather than to the king's advisor)."'
Opponents of the military policy could compare such prosecutions to
the military's. discharge policy. As the DOD's training manual indicates, a
352. Chapin, supra note 341, at 81; Wilson, supra note 339, at 113.
353. This point is also made in George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 Md. L
Rev. 193, 193 (1982).
354. Hurst, supra note 333, at 129-30; Wilson, supra note 339, at 113.
355. 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 348 (1911);
Wilson, supra note 339, at 113.
356. 2 Farrand, supra note 355, at 344-50; Wilson, supra note 339, at 113-15.
357. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1945).
358. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that the requirement of
an overt act protects a person from prosecution for her thoughts).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 36-44 (discussing § H.l.b(2) of the 1994
Directives).
360. 1 Campbell, supra note 336, at 149-50.
361. Id. at 149.
362. Id. at 149-50. This account of the convictions of both Walker and Burdet is
disputed by Edward Foss. 4 Edward Foss, Judges of England 414-16 (1851). Even Foss'
versions, however, indicate that both men were executed in the absence of any overt act. See
also Finer, supra note 335, at 865 n.13; Wilson, supra note 339, at 105 n.19.
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servicemember may be discharged in the absence of an act other than
stating that she is lesbian, even if she has offered evidence which conflicts
with the military's presumption of likely misconduct0s6 Because the
government need not provide evidence of a "bad act" for discharge, it is
nearly impossible for the servicemember to prove a negative-that she has
no intent to engage in same-sex conduct.m Similarly, it was effectively
impossible for Sir Thomas to prove that he had no intent to kill the king.
Moreover, in both constructive treason prosecutions and military
discharges, the individual's actual intent can be ignored entirely. This is
evidenced by the conviction of William Walker for telling a joke and the
discharge of servicemembers who identified their sexual orientation for the
purpose of mounting a legal challenge against the anti-gay policy.'o
3. Treason Convictions Overturned: Burr and Cramer
Treason prosecutions are politically volatile because the accusation
underlying such prosecutions-as with Smith Act prosecutions-is that the
defendant is an enemy of the state. Pro-equality advocates could invoke the
treason prosecutions of Aaron Burr and Anthony Cramer to challenge the
military's discharge policy. Burr and Cramer, like gay servicemembers,
were politically unpopular. Just as the government claims that gay
servicemembers present a threat to combat effectiveness (and hence our
nation's security),6 so it had asserted that Burr and Cramer's acts of
treason threatened our nation. Finally, pro-equality advocates could point
to treason's requirement of an overt act. Despite the asserted threat to
national security, the Supreme Court overturned Burr's indictment and
Cramer's conviction due to lack of evidence that either man committed
the overt act charged.
a. Aaron Burr
In the infamous treason prosecution of Aaron Burr, the government
indicted Burr for organizing a conspiracy to create a new nation in the
western United States. 67 His ill-fated term of Vice-President had
concluded the previous year in 1805, after Burr killed Alexander Hamilton
in a duel. Burr was rejected by Federalists and Republicans alike: "To many
Federalists [Burr] appeared as Hamilton's murderer; Republicans saw him
363. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text (noting that even if servicemember
proffers all conceivable evidence, she nonethelesss may be discharged).
364. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of disproving
a purported tendency to commit an act at some unspecified time in the future).
365. See eg., Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (gay plaintiffs
brought suit to declare 1994 Directives invalid even though discharge proceedings
had not been commenced against some of them).
366. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text (arguing that the military's "unit
cohesion" rationale is simply the widely refuted "national security" rationale in another guise).
367. Chapin, supra note 341, at 98-100.
1035
80 IOWA LAW REVIEW
as the would-be betrayer of Jefferson."36 In short, "the door to political
preferment [had] slammed in [Burr's] face .... "59 The government
asserted that Burr had organized an expedition of twenty armed men to
raft down the Ohio River with the intention of conquering the American
west to create a new nation.Y70 Evidence was conflicting. Eric Bollman, a
Burr supporter who was also tried unsuccessfully for treason, 7' claimed
that Burr instead intended to conquer Mexico.ss The expedition
party-while Burr was not present-assembled on Blennerhassett's
Island.375 Prior to the departure of the expedition party, the group
pointed their rifles at and threatened to kill a man who was attempting to
arrest one of the party's leaders.7 4 The indictment charged that the
group's action constituted the requisite overt act of levying war. 7  7
Burr was absent when the alleged act of levying war occurred.!7 8 He
later joined the party on their rafts further down the river." While en
route, the army detained the expedition and arrested Burr, among
others.7 8 "The capital seethed with rumor" 7 ' after Burr's arrest, and
the President himself spearheaded Bur's indictment In fact, in a
special message to Congress prior to Burr's trial, Jefferson named Burr as
"the principal actor, whose guilt is placed beyond question."38' In the
government's haste' to convict a presumed traitor, Burr was prosecuted
pursuant to a faulty indictment s Marshall, sitting as circuit judge,
concluded that Burr's indictment was flawed. 4 The indictment declared
the overt act to be the activities at Blennerhassett's Island, which occurred
368. Id. at 98.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 98-100.
371. Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
Emphasizing the potential for abuse in treason prosecutions, Chief Justice Marshall
held that there was insufficient evidence to support Bolinan's indictment. Id. at 135.
372. Wilson, supra note 339, at 117.
373. Chapin, supra note 341, at 99-100; Wilson, supra note 339, at 117-19.
374. Chapin, supra note 341, at 99; Wilson, supra note 339, at 117.
375. Chapin, supra note 341, at 99; Wilson, supra note 339, at 118-19.
376. Chapin, supra note 341, at 99.
377. Id. at 100.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See id. (stating that "[t]he initiative [for bringing Burr to trial] was
Jefferson's.").
381. Chapin, supra note 341, at 100.
382. For example, the day after Jefferson named Burr in his special message, the
Senate "rushed [a bill to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for two of Burr's accused
conspirators] through three readings in a single day." Id. The bill ultimately failed to pass. Id.
at 101.
383. Historian Bradley Chapin concluded that "[h]owever one approaches the
Issue, [one] must conclude that the indictment of Aaron Burr was faulty." Id. at 112.
384. Wilson, supra note 339, at 118-19; see also Chapin, supra note 341, at 105 (noting
that the Burr indictment was flawed).
1036 [1995]
OF COMMUNISM, TREASON, AND ADDICTION
in Burr's absence.s" Emphasizing the requirement of an overt act,
Marshall rejected the prosecution's argument that Burr was constructively
present on the island.386
b. Anthony Cramer
Although less notorious than Burr's treason prosecution, the
prosecution of Anthony Cramer also was highly charged. Cramer was a
German-born American accused of collaborating with the Nazis during
World War II. Cramer was a friend of Wemer Thiel, a member of a
group of eight German saboteurs who arrived in the United States in 1942
via enemy submarine.- 8 Prior to Cramer's prosecution, the Supreme
Court had affirmed the war crimes convictions of the saboteurs.3
At Cramer's trial, the only evidence offered by the government was
that, upon Thiel's clandestine arrival into the United States, Cramer met
him twice for drinks.-'o The government provided no evidence
concerning the content of the men's conversations.3 91 This proved to be
a fatal flaw in the prosecution's case. The Supreme Court held that
evidence of the men's conversations must provide evidence of treasonable
intent. The Court also rejected the prosecution's assertion that the
conversations, regardless of their content, provided "psychological comfort'
to the enemy "The difficulty with this argument is that the whole purpose
of the constitutional provision is to make sure that treason conviction shall
rest on direct proof of two witnesses and not on even a little imagina-
tion." 92 Cramer did confess at trial that he had agreed .to hold Thiel's
money belt containing $3,600!93 The government, however, could not
rely on Cramer's testimony. Prior to trial it had withdrawn the "money
belt! allegation for lack of proof*SH In dicta, the Supreme Court noted
that receiving the money belt may have constituted sufficient grounds for
treason 5 Nonetheless-and even though the American war effort was in
full swing-the Justices overturned the conviction 9
Of all the Court's treason decisions, Cramer exhibits the greatest
concern over the government's potential to abuse its broad power to
prosecute for treason. The majority extensively reviewed the history of the
385. Chapin, supra note 341, at 105.
386. Id. at 112.
387. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
388. Id. at 3.
389. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
390. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 5.
391. Id. at 37.
392. Id. at 38.
393. Id. at 38-39.
394. Id. at 39.
395. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 39 ("If these acts had been submitted as overt acts of
treason ... we would have a quite different case.").
396. Id. at 48.
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treason clause, noting that the Framers, "having risked their necks under
the law... feared despotism and arbitrary power more than they feared
treason."' 97 The Supreme Court was careful to distinguish nonpunishable
belief from punishable conduct. Cautioning that "mere mental attitudes or
expressions should not be treason," 93 the majority concluded: "A citizen
intellectually or emotionally may favor the enemy and harbor sympathies
or convictions disloyal to this country's policy or interest, but so long as he
commits no act of aid and comfort to the enemy, there is no treason."59
The Cramer Court's reasoning supports the pro-equality argument that
servicemembers may not be discharged based upon the content of their
thoughts or emotions in the absence of same-sex conduct. The Cramer
majority recognized that the ability to suppress dissenting views is inherent
in governmental power. It emphasized that a principle of tolerance is
implicit in our democratic form of government: "The idea that...
opposition to [the government's] abuses is not treason has made our
government tolerant of opposition based on differences of opinion that in
some parts of the world would have kept the hangman busy."4 Such a
statement of judicial philosophy could be useful in military discharge
litigation. The government has conceded that its anti-gay policy is based
upon heterosexual intolerance of differences in sexual orientation and
upon the presumed effect that such intolerance would have upon unit
cohesion.'O
B. Pro-Equality Rejection of the Law of Treason
Justice Douglas, who invoked the English experience with constructive
treason in his Scales dissent, warned of the dangers of state suppression of
disfavored beliefs:
History shows in one example after another how excessive have
been the fears of earlier generations, who shuddered at menaces
that, with the benefit of hindsight, we now know were mere
shadows .... Suppression, once accepted as a way of life, is likely
to spread. It reinforces the herd urge toward orthodoxies of all
kinds-religious, economic, and moral as well as political.0 2
Even though the law of treason protected Burr and Cramer, examples of
other treason prosecutions illustrate that the government may have utilized
the law of treason to target dissenting views or may simply have failed to
protect belief. Moreover, the treason analogy suffers from the longstanding
397. Id. at 15 (quoting 3 Henry Adams, History of the United States 468 (1838-
1918)).
398. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 28.
399. Id. at 29.
400. Id. at 13.
401. See supra note 289 (quoting congressional rationale of threat to unit
cohesion as support for the discharge policy).
402. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 274 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Gelihorn, supra note 294, at 82-83).
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association of gay persons with traitors, an association which may
(mis)inform judicial decisionmaking, particularly when judges are faced
with claimed concerns for national security.
1. Failure to Protect Belief
According to one commentator, the misuse of treason began early in
our post-revolutionary history: "[T]he leaders of the new government
aggressively used treason prosecutions against their political enemies.
" 
4
3
Continuing into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the state indicted
religious and political dissenters even though the evidence of treason was
weak. Two such nineteenth century cases are the prosecutions of Joseph
Smith, founder of the Mormon Church,4 and Castner Hanway, an
abolitionist.4°5 Both defendants were indicted despite scant evidence of
specific intent to overthrow the government4°  More recently, the
Supreme Court upheld the World War II conviction of Hans Haupt, even
though the overt acts charged were largely indistinguishable from those
the Court previously had held to be insufficient for conviction in Cramer.
These prosecutions suggest that the law of treason does not provide
sufficiently strong precedent for pro-equality advocates.
a. Joseph Smith
In 1838, Joseph Smith was indicted for committing treason against the
state of Missouri.4°7 Espousing beliefs which sometimes diverged radically
from the dominant Christian theology,4 s Mormons had been involved in
recurring violence with the non-Mormon majority.4 Following Smith's
indictment, the state of Missouri did not pursue the treason charge and
Smith escaped.410 After moving the Mormon community to illinois and
declaring martial law, Smith again was arrested for treason.41 Soon after
Smith's arrest, however, a mob dragged him out of his jail cell and lynched
403. Wilson, supra note 339, at 116.
404. Hurst, supra note 333, at 264.
405. Wilson, supra note 339, at 119.
406. See infra notes 413-15 and accompanying text (arguing that treason charge
against Smith was faulty); see also notes 428-31 and accompanying text (arguing that
treason charge against Hanway was faulty).
407. Hurst, supra note 333, at 264.
408. One of the controversial beliefs of the early Mormon Church was that male
Church members were commanded by God to practice polygamy. See Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (noting Mormons' belief that male members of the Church
who do not practice polygamy are condemned to eternal damnation). Mormons were
prosecuted for polygamy under various statutes. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14
(1946) (upholding Mormon polygamist's conviction pursuant to federal statute that
prohibited interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes); Reynold4 98 U.S. at 165
(upholding criminalization of polygamy and rejecting free exercise challenge).
409. Hurst, supra note 333, at 264.
410. Id.
411. Id.
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him.1 2
While the Mormons had engaged in violence, it is doubtful that either
charge of treason was appropriate. As one legal historian observed:
Both charges seem severe, since they followed a long history of
mutual recrimination and violence between the Mormons and
their neighbors; and it seems likely that on a fair trial a limited
purpose of self-defense, rather than intent to set up a rival
government, could have been made out.""
Concerning the Illinois charge, even Illinois's Governor Ford indicated
that the charge was dubious because the Mormons may have been
attempting to defend themselves.4 4 Ford wrote that Smith's subsequent
murder suggested that the militia may have intended "to use the process of
the law.., for the purpose of murdering [the Mormons] afterwards," in
which case "it might well be doubted whether [the Mormons] were guilty
of treason.
415
That Smith likely was indicted for his beliefs-and was subject to
violence as well-argues against pro-equality reliance upon the treason
analogy because gay persons may face similar risks. Smith's incarcerations
left him vulnerable to violence by private citizens, possibly with the
connivance of the state militia. Similarly, anti-gay measures, such as sodomy
statutes or the military's exclusionary policy, may subject gay persons to
violence. For instance, Michael Hardwick's incarceration for sodomy left
him vulnerable to violence by inmates, reportedly with the connivance of
prison guards.416 Kendall Thomas has argued that sodomy statutes
"legitimize homophobic violence and thus violate the right to be free from
state-legitimized violence at the hands of private and public actors."
417
The same can be said of the military's anti-gay policy: upon initiating
discharge proceedings against Corporal Blaesing, is commanding officer
sequestered Blaesing for fear of "what other folks might do to him."
41 8
The treason analogy would not necessarily offer gay litigants the protection
which they seek.
b. Castner Hanway
Approximately a decade after Smith's incarceration, Castuer Hanway,
an abolitionist who had written books and pamphlets opposing slavery and
412. Id.; Wilson, supra note 339, at 119.
413. Hurst, supra note 333, at 264.
414. Id. at 270-71.
415. Id. (quoting Ford, History of Illinois 337 (1854)).
416. Hardwick has recounted that the prison guards informed the inmates that he
was gay, with the remark, "Wait until we put [him] into the bullpen. Well, fags
shouldn't mind-after all, that's why they are here." Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1439 (1992).
417. Id. at 1435.
418. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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the Fugitive Slave Act,41 9 was prosecuted for treason4 0 A confrontation
arose when a United States Deputy and a slave -"owner" attempted to
forcefully recapture escaped slaves.42' Hanway was present and urged the
posse to free the slaves and to leave.4u The Deputy ordered Hanway to
assist him in recapturing the slaves; Hanway refused4 s The confrontation
became violent and one person was killed; the slaves fled to Canada.4
In reaction to the ensuing rage of white Southerners, President
Fillmore stated that prosecuting Hanway would be useful politically, even if
problematic legally.42 The federal government apparently desired to
demonstrate to the South that the Fugitive Slave Act would help quell the
abolitionist movement. The "opportunity to make an early example [of
Hanway] led the Federal authorities to press the treason charge over the
efforts of the state ... to prosecute for murder or at least riot."425 The
government charged that Hanway's forcible resistance to the Deputy
constituted levying war against the United States.
42
One of the bases for the alleged treason was the publication of
Hanway's pamphlets and books, which the government claimed incited
slaves to resist with violence the implelientation of the Fugitive Slave
Act.4 28 At trial, Justice Grier (on circuit) instructed the jury that forcible
resistance to the 'law, in itself, does not constitute treason.4 2 The jury
acquitted Hanway 0 Despite the acquittal, the government's reliance
upon Hanway's writings as a basis for a charge of treason came
dangerously dose to punishing Hanway for his political views. This
potential for prosecution based on belief argues against pro-equality
reliance upon the treason analogy. Despite the protections inherent in the
law of treason, Hanway and other abolitionists likely were deterred from
expressing their opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act. There is no reason to
believe that an analogy to treason would adequately protect
servicemembers who are deterred from expressing their opposition to the
armed services' discharge policy.431
419. Wilson, supra note 339, at 119-20.
420. Id.
421. Hurst, supra note 333, at 197; Wilson, supra note 339, at 119.
422. Id.
423. Hurst, supra note 333, at 197-98; 'Wilson, supra note 339, at 119.
424. Wilson, supra note 339, at 119-20.
425. Id. at 120 (citing 9 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 211 (Ford ed. 1898)).
426. Hurst, supra note 333, at 268.
427.' Id. at 197.
428. Id. at 120.
429. Id. at 197-98.
430. Id. at 197.
431. See supra notes 387-96 and accompanying text (describing the scheme of German
sabotage and the conviction of the saboteurs).
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c. Hans Haupt
The prosecution of Anthony Cramer, discussed above, and Hans
Haupt arose from the same scheme of German sabotage for which eight
Germans were convicted of war crimes.4 2 Even though the underlying
facts in Haupt v. United States are similar to those in Cramer, the Supreme
Court overturned Cramer's conviction but affirmed Haupt's sentence of
life imprisonment. 43 Haupt was the father of one of the eight saboteurs;
his son already had been convicted and executed for treason. m The
government charged Haupt with three overt acts of treason: permitting his
son to live for six days in Haupt's apartment; helping his son secure work
in a munitions plant; and purchasing a car for his son.
i. The Haupt Decision: Statements of Belief Admitted as Evidence
Both the concurrence 5 and dissent 8 in Haupt asserted that no
meaningful distinction existed between the acts alleged in Cramer and
those alleged in Haup since neither set of acts evidenced a treasonable
intent. In Cramer the overt act was the defendant's conversations with an
enemy agent, the content of which was unknown. 7 In Haupt, the
defendant's aid to an enemy agent, his son, could have sprung solely from
fatherly love.4M Justice Douglas-concurring in Haupt despite the
conflicting outcome of the two decisions0 9 saw no principled distinction
between the two sets of acts:
Two witnesses saw the son enter Haupt's apartment house at
night and leave in the morning. That act, without more, was an
[sic] innocent as Cramer's conversation with the agent. For
nothing would be more natural... than the act of a father
opening the family door to a son. That act raised, therefore, no
more implication that the father was giving his son aid and
comfort in a treasonable project than did the meeting of the
defendant with the enemy agent in the Cramer case. 4"
432. Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1946) (affirming conviction); Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (overturning conviction).
433. Haup4 330 U.S. at 641-42.
434. Id. at 646 (Murphy, J, dissenting).
435. Id. at 644 (Douglas, J., concurring).
436. Id. at 646 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
437. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 37-38.
438. Haupt 330 U.S. at 644-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
439. Id. at 64546 (stating that the overt act requirement had been met in Cramer
and that "(t]he Cramer case [had] departed from the rules"). Justice Douglas further
distinguished Cramer by looking to evidence-which had not been proven by the
testimony of two witnesses--that Haupt supported Germany and knew that his son was
a saboteur. Id. at 645.
440. Id. at 644-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In fact, the concerns of the Haupt dissent seem to reflect more accurately
those of the Cramer majority. "Only when the alleged overt act manifests
treason beyond all reasonable doubt can we be certain that the traitor's
stigma will be limited to those whose actions constitute a real threat to the
safety of the nation."44'
The crucial distinction between the outcomes in Cramer and Haupt
thus seems not to turn on the defendants' acts; rather, it seems to turn on
the Supreme Court's decision to admit into evidence "conversations [which
had occurred] long prior to the indictment... showing sympathy with
Germany and hostility to the United States.""5 The Court's reliance
upon Haupt's statements arguably runs counter to its assertion in Cramer
that emotional support for the enemy does not constitute treason. While
noting that Haupt's statements of sympathy for Germany had to be
"scrutinized with care to be certain the statements are not expressions of
mere... difference of opinion with our own government,"" 3 the Court
nevertheless concluded that Haupt's statements should be submitted to the
jury4" The Supreme Court's reliance upon Haupt's support for Germany
suggests that a defendant may. be convicted based upon that which the
Cramer majority held to be protected: one's "mere mental attitudes or
expressions."" 5
ii. Military Discharge Litigation: Statements of Gay Identity
Admitted as Evidence
The juxtaposition of Cramer and Haupt undercuts the pro-equality
argument that the law of treason "express[es] the constitutional principle
that a person's thoughts are his own."40 The Supreme Court upheld
Haupt's conviction for acts similar to Cramer's non-treasonable conduct,
relying, in addition, upon Haupt's statements of belief. In the context of
the 1994 Directives, the military may argue that a servicemember's
otherwise permissible act, such as attending a gay-rights demonstration, is
grounds for discharge when coupled with evidence of the member's state
of mind suggesting she is lesbian." 7 Moreover, the government could
support it's "don't tell" provision by invoking the Supreme Court's reliance
441. Id. at 648 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
442. Id. at 642.
443. Haup 330 U.S. at 642.
444. Id. at 641-42.
445. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 28.
446. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev4' 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
447. In fact, the military claims that permissible acts, such as participation in a gay-
rights demonstrations or reading gay literature, translate into grounds for
discharge if a reasonable person would believe that the servicemember is gay. See supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
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upon Haupt's statements of belief. If Haupt's statements of affiliation with
Germany may be introduced to support his conviction, the argument runs,
then a gay servicemember's statement of group identity likewise could be
used as evidence for discharge.
2. Stigmatic Association of Traitors with Lesbians,
Bisexuals, and Gay Men
In the same way that the government demonized Communists and gay
persons as national security risks,"4 concern with national security
created a stigmatic association of nonheterosexuals with traitors. Even
assuming that the law of treason provides pro-equality advocates with useful
precedent, advocates should reject the analogy. Given the military's long-
standing presumption that lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men were more
likely to betray the government,45 the longstanding (mis)perception of
gay persons as traitors makes a pro-equality treason argument particularly
risky in military litigation. Even though the state can no longer credibly
claim that there is a national security threat of "homosexual black-
mail," 40 the government continues to claim that the presence of gay
servicemembers jeopardizes combat effectiveness.
The "peculiar intimidation and stigma carried by the mere accusation
of treason,"4 2 is made all the more potent by its "potentialities... as a
political epithet."' 5 By making an analogy to treason in military
discharge litigation, pro-equality advocates inadvertently may evoke this
stigma. The identity of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men is so closely
intertwined with the identity of traitors that, in a contemporary work on
treason by Chapman Pincher, an entire chapter is dedicated to
consideration of the role of same-sex orientation in acts of treason.4
The chapter opens with the observation that "[t]here is a common belief
that homosexuality is particularly widespread among traitors .... 415
Likewise, in Sex and Reason, Judge Richard Posner discusses the "lurid
claims redolent of the time when homosexuality and treason were thought
two sides of the same coin....
Both Pincher"O and Posnero8 reject the view that same-sex identity
448. See supra part IH.B.3 (a-c).
449. As discussed above, the DOD's own studies "have refuted DOD's position on the
potential security risk associated with homosexual orientation.... " Sew The 1992 Study, supra
note 53.
450. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text
451. See supra notes 295-316 and accompanying text (discussing the stigmatic
association of communists with gay persons).
452. Hurst, supra note 333, at 149.
453. Id. at 150.
454. Chapman Pincher, Traitors: The Anatomy of Treason 103 (1987).
455. Id.
456. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 322 (1992).
457. Pincher, supra note 454, at 103.
458. Posner, supra note 456, at 322.
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is prevalent among traitors. Judge Posner goes even further and asserts that
an openly gay person does not present a security risk and thus should not
be denied a security clearance: "[O]ne finds.., little evidence that
homosexuality is particularly widespread among traitors. It is difficult to
make a persuasive argument that a known (hence blackmail-proof)
homosexual who satisfies all... other criteria for a security clearance
should be denied one."4 9 Pincher, however, seemed unable to free his
analysis from an association of gay persons with treason (and Commu-
nism). Despite Pincher's conclusion that most traitors are not gay, he
nonetheless claimed that there may be a relationship between same-sex
orientation and a propensity towards treason:
[T]he treatment of homosexuals as criminals and degenerates was
hardly likely to encourage uncritical devotion to the established
regime... which they would see as inhuman and oppressive. The
social and legal condemnation of homosexuals may well have
converted some of them into 'outsiders' with a chip on the
shoulder, deeply resentful of a society which made a serious
offence of the sexual expression which they found natural.
Psychologists suspect that such resentment can create a
'minority complex,' with the victim subconsciously or even
consciously prepared to hit back at the privileged majority...
treachery being one way of doing so.4 °
Pincher's analysis illustrates the tenacity of the association between
gay persons and treason. He refuted the notion that same-sex orientation is
widespread among traitors and presented a fairly sympathetic view towards
the discrimination suffered by nonheterosexuals. Pincher nevertheless
portrayed lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men as emotionally unstable rebels
who may resort to treason out of resentment. The principal risk of the pro-
equality treason analogy is that in spite of accurate factual information,
judges may-like Pincher-be influenced by the stigmatic preconception
that gay persons are treacherous.
CONCLUSION
For opponents of the 1994 Directives, the Robinson/PoweU4 Smith Act,
and treason analogies are double-edged. In theory, these decisions prohibit
conviction based solely upon one's status or beliefs in the absence of a
criminal actus reus. In practice, however, the Supreme Court has construed
the requirement of an act leniently, affirnming convictions in spite of little
or no evidence of prohibited conduct. In addition, all three models have
troubling implications for pro-equality advocates because they evoke
stigmatic associations of same-sex orientation which may negatively affect
459. Id. at 321-22.
460. Pincher, supra note 454, at 103 (citations omitted). Pincher's view of gay
persons as rebels who are less likely to adhere to the prevailing group structure would seem to
be a particularly inaccurate description of those who choose to enter the military.
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judicial decisionmaking.
Under the Robinson/Powell analogy, which conceptualizes same-sex
orientation as a status, pro-equality litigators could argue that Robinson and
Powell prohibit status-based military discharges. The government, however,
could respond that the conviction of Powell for "being drunk in public"
would support military discharge for "being gay in public"-evidenced by
servicemembers' statements that they are gay. Moreover, the Robin-
son/Powell medical model of status could inflame pre-existing negative
images of same-sex orientation held by judges, particularly that
homosexuality is akin to addiction, disease, mental illness, or an irresistible
compulsion which one is powerless to avoid. Despite the surface
attractiveness of the status approach, then, it may backfire by providing the
government with a defense of its military policy and by evoking the
pathologizing trope of same-sex orientation, thereby increasing judicial
receptiveness towards the anti-gay policy.
The Smith Act and treason analogies share a conceptualization of
same-sex orientation as a form of "political dissent! as well as a connection
with the McCarthy era's attacks on homosexuality. In tandem with the
Senate Subcommittee's attempts to ferret out suspected Communists,
Senator McCarthy spearheaded a virulent campaign against suspected
lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men. The reigning presumption during the
Red Scare was that nonheterosexuals and Communists were more likely to
be traitors and betray their country. The McCarthy era illustrates
that-then as now-the government's fears regarding gay people are so
grossly exaggerated as to be irrational. Inherent in governmental power is
the ability to suppress dissent; during the McCarthy era, use of this power
resulted in enforced orthodoxy.
Neither the Communist Party cases nor the treason decisions stand as
a bulwark in defense of civil liberties. In both sets of cases, the Supreme
Court affirmed some convictions even though there was little or no
evidence of illegal acts; reliance upon these decisions would leave the
government free to argue that the military may discharge servicemembers
in the absence of same-sex conduct. Just as the Supreme Court affirmed
Smith Act convictions relying in part upon generalized presumptions that
the Communist Party intended to overthrow the government at some
future date, the military could presume that gay servicemembers will
engage in same-sex conduct at some future date. The government also
could invoke Haupt's treason conviction. Haupt's statements of sympathy
with Germany were used as evidence of treason; the statement "I'm gay"
similarly could be used as evidence of same-sex conduct.
While the evocative power of the McCarthy era's hysteria and
repression could prove useful to pro-equality litigators, that same power
could boomerang. Since 1957, the military's own studies have refuted the
notions that gay persons are more susceptible to blackmail and thus are
more of a threat to national security. Nevertheless, via its "unit cohesion"
argument, the government has brought the "security risk" specter in
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through the back door. Presented with these analogies in military
litigation, the stigmatic association of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men with
Communists and traitors (and hence as potential security risks) is likely to
be fresh in ajudge's mind, potentially making discharge for one's same-sex
orientation-as for Communism or treachery-seem rational.
